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ABSTRACT 
Since 1991, a long list of scholars has sought to write off Clausewitz as 
outdated and no longer worth study. In light of the past fifteen years and the 
absence of a strategic victory in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, 
Clausewitz’s early retirement is misguided, to say the least. Are the classical 
theories of Clausewitz on the nature of war—particularly concerning small wars 
and insurgencies—relevant to contemporary conflicts since September 11, 
2001?  
This study is chiefly based on secondary sources, including books and 
scholarly articles originating from the work of scholars, political researchers, and 
think tanks. The research method is qualitative, and it compares, contrasts, 
summarizes, and critically assesses the adaptations of, and effects on, 
counterinsurgency policy, strategy, and doctrine in English-speaking nations and 
Europe. 
The study shows that the content of Clausewitz’s On War must be 
understood in the political and strategic context of the 21st century and not that 
of the 19th century. Now is the time to put aside visceral reactions against 
Clausewitz and start to study his work with closer attention, especially at the 
junction of the military and the political. 
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At the end of the Cold War, the regular armed forces of the Western world 
stumbled into an existential crisis, because the Warsaw Pact, the main adversary 
on which they focused for almost five decades, vanished overnight without a 
fight. This existential crisis began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
became a reality in 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and with the 
advent of war in south Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In 1991, The 
Transformation of War1 by Martin van Creveld was the first influential 
mainstream text or manifesto criticizing Clausewitz to appear. Published during 
the Gulf War, his book was a direct result of Israel’s struggle, since 1948, with 
irregular conflict. In his book, van Creveld rejected what he deemed to be Carl 
von Clausewitz’s theories and their applications as an obsolete tool, which, with 
the end of the Cold War, had lost its purpose.  
Clausewitz’s theories, according to van Creveld, had little relevance in the 
face of terrorism, irregular war, and counterinsurgency as they manifested 
themselves with growing ferocity in the years after 1991. His book influenced 
military thinkers for almost two decades, especially as conflict in this period 
diverged from that of the Cold War’s collective military memory of wide-scale 
combat and operational doctrine, especially after the second Iraqi campaign 
(2003) became bogged down in an insurgency. Van Creveld’s approach resulted 
in two main consequences for makers of western strategy: Counterinsurgency 
began to be seen as a new and separate kind of war, and the military realm 
became even further separated from the political, resulting in a series of blunders 
at a strategic level. 
However, the content of Clausewitz’s On War must be understood in the 
political and strategic context of the 21st century, and not that of the 19th 
century, when it was written. Since nation-states have not disintegrated in the 
                                            
1 Published by The Free Press. 
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face of terrorism and irregular war, and because war in whatever form serves 
some political purpose, however diffuse, Clausewitz still plays a role in the 
analysis of war, especially from a continental European point of view. Technology 
may have evolved and influenced tactical approaches to operations and fighting, 
but the cornerstones of strategy have changed little since the inception of nuclear 
weapons in the middle 1940s.  
A scholar of enduring vision and importance for this age as well as his 
own, Bernard Brodie recognized that strategy under nuclear threat changed the 
paradigm of a winnable war; henceforth, armed forces’ first efforts were to avoid 
war through successful deterrence.2 The end of the Cold War, as well as 
progress in the ballistic, command and control, targeting, and types of munitions, 
however, shifted this paradigm back to the possibility for armed forces to fight 
and win smaller wars, as had been imperative during Clausewitz’s time.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis wrestles with the following question: Are the classical theories 
of Carl von Clausewitz on the nature of war relevant since September 11, 2001, 
particularly concerning small wars and insurgencies? Second, this thesis 
analyzes how and why such classical theory has played a role, whether positively 
or negatively in the 21st century. This thesis strives to be of use to students of 
war as well as senior defense and military figures confronted with the perpetually 
changing face of contemporary military conflicts.  
B. CLAUSEWITZ VERSUS JOMINI, YESTERDAY AND TODAY 
The operational level of war is a recurrent friction point between the 
respective views of Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s schools of thought about the levels 
of war and the nature of war. The Jominian approach to war as science and the 
emphasis on the massing of overwhelming force at the decisive point through the 
able hands of a single, senior commander does not answer the need for 
                                            
2 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 148–
149. 
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comprehensive strategy, as Clausewitz has argued, because military might alone 
does not solve politically rooted problems. 
Clausewitz, on the other hand, assumed that strategy not only must be 
defined before entering a war to create the desired political and strategic 
outcome, but these aspects can change constantly due to the interaction and 
friction of war. He most famously noted that strategy is formed by the close 
intercourse of politics and military interaction. Thus, the armed forces adapt their 
tactics and operational plans if the strategy changes.  
As it relates to the research question, winning a war is more than winning 
all battles; the political and strategic outcome should be better than at the start, 
and the result should be a safe and secure environment. In recent conflicts, from 
the ex-Yugoslav and Kuwait wars in the early 1990s onward, armed forces won 
all the battles, such as they were, but, especially in the cases of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya, the environments after the fighting subsided were neither 
safer nor secure. The political results have left much to be desired.  
Hence, part of the problem may be situated at this juncture: the 
operational level in its classical character as delineated by Field Marshal Helmut 
von Moltke in the 19th century and as it has reemerged in 20th century conflicts. 
Today, at this level, the military interacts with the political in the wider sense of 
mass politics and the uses of violence.  
Clausewitz’s analytical work, On War, if carefully studied and properly 
used by students of war, may be the cornerstone of a comprehensive approach 
to counterinsurgency and future conflicts, despite the assertions of its many 
critics in the English-speaking world since September 11, 2001, and earlier. Far 
from being obsolete, Clausewitz remains one of the salient ways to understand 
the dynamics and greater truths of war and warfare. 
 4 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Clausewitz’s work, On War, is an introspection on the relation between 
war and policy and the nature of war in theory and war in fact. Specifically, 
Clausewitz linked fundamental principles between the two realms—policy and 
the political on the one hand, and, on the other, the military as it moved from its 
dynastic foundation to its national character—and their interactions. Clausewitz 
did not try to give a template for success; rather, he proposed a construct to 
conceptualize a comprehensive approach to maximize chances of success. This 
approach makes his work more relevant today than Jomini’s “recipe,” which, 
according to Jomini, should always bring success if executed correctly.  
The U.S. armed forces have relied heavily on Jomini’s work in their 
military training and education in a manner that is little understood, but which has 
been widely present, since the early 19th century. This reliance on Jomini has 
been the factor that has enabled the U.S. armed forces, throughout history, to 
successfully formulate doctrine and to win battles amid successful campaigns in 
certain theaters of war. However, since World War II—for reasons that bear close 
examination today—U.S. forces are less successful in winning the peace once 
“Phase III” is completed.3  
This record may be explained by the fact that Clausewitz is seldom read 
or understood by military or political leaders. The omission has important 
ramifications. The neo-Clausewitzian British officer and scholar Emile Simpson 
stated correctly that “Jomini … writes about warfare rather than war. Clausewitz, 
                                            
3 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2011), xxiii–xxiv. A military operation is sequenced in six phases: Phase 0 is the shaping; Phase I 
is the deterrence; Phase II is the seizure of initiative; Phase III is the domination; Phase IV is the 
stabilization; and Phase V is the enabling of the civilian authority. “Dominate (Phase III). The 
dominate phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat 
situations, control of the operational environment. Stabilize (Phase IV). The stabilize phase is 
required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint 
force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other 
supporting/ contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG department and agency participants 
until legitimate local entities are functioning.” Ibid. 
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on the other contrary, writes to explain war, shaped by society and politics, as it 
functions according to means and ends.”4  
Evidence of this dichotomy can be found in the military results in the 
recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, at the end of “Phase III” and the 
beginning of “Phase IV” until the withdrawal of the coalition troops. Observers of 
these wars saw the surprising presence of non-comprehensive approaches; it 
was a mistake to use the tactics of counterinsurgency as the grand strategy. The 
misreading of Clausewitz’s “trinity” and the non-acceptance of counterinsurgency 
as a part of the violence continuum5 led planners to think about these conflicts 
with far too much optimism as a special case of warfare. 
As a witness to war in its varied forms in the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
period, Clausewitz understood well what later came to be called 
counterinsurgency. This insight, however, is not recognized as such by his critics, 
and his theories are not applied correctly. The critics of Clausewitz read his 
theory with a Jominian, didactic, and tactically oriented approach. Therefore, they 
tend to misunderstand the relationship between the political and military realm at 
the strategic level during an operation. The vocabulary used by Clausewitz and 
Jomini is not adapted correctly in today’s idiom, which has led to mistakes in the 
interpretation of their theories. This misinterpretation is particularly true 
concerning the word strategy, because before World War I, “strategy” was 
narrowly focused on military matters without regard for the diplomatic, 
informational, economic, or political realm of a country. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis grapples with the difficulties of having a comprehensive 
approach to the study of contemporary conflict that leads to a sound end. First, 
                                            
4 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 136. 
5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 81. “Wars can have all degrees of importance and 
intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to a simple armed observation.” 
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the way by which influences can be traced may be blurry or distorted. Second, 
the abundance of literature on Clausewitz and all interpretations of his work 
cannot be read in anything like their entirety to produce this thesis; the same can 
be said of the surfeit of information on recent conflicts.  
Finally, part of this work is based on assumptions that are themselves 
based on literature and articles that rest on their own assumptions. Therefore, 
this thesis should be considered as a first step for a larger study or a doctoral 
dissertation. However, none of these limitations prevent a critical assessment of 
the literature used. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The selected literature was reviewed in two steps—the first focusing more 
on Clausewitz’s relevance prior to 9/11, and the second focusing more on 
Clausewitz in relation to insurgency. 
1. From 1989 to 2001 
According to both John Shy in The Maker of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age6 and Bruno Colson in La Culture Stratégique 
Américaine,7 the U.S. armed forces have throughout their history relied 
principally on Jomini for their education in strategy, that is, a prescriptive 
approach with its origins in the Napoleonic period and transmitted through 
American military doctrine. These doctrines of Jomini were injected into the 
education and training of the U.S. Army through West Point and the teachers of 
tactics and fortifications raised in the French school of military instruction of the 
mid-19th century.  
                                            
6 Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 143–85. 
7 Bruno Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine (Paris: Economica, 1993). 
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Around the time of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in 1975, a usable translation 
of Clausewitz was completed in the university world,8 and his work started to be 
read more widely. In order to explain why Vietnam was unsuccessful, the armed 
forces turned their attention to Clausewitz and concluded that solutions in the 
military realm were not synchronized with the political realm.9 The Goldwater-
Nichols Act, which enabled the transformation of the armed forces structures in 
the mid-80s, is one of the reforms that grew from this intellectual shift. 
Clausewitz’s theories gained popularity during this period and were added 
to military academies’ syllabi, but Clausewitz’s contribution to a better 
understanding between the operational level and the strategic level had not 
reached its full potential. This fact is partially explained by the victory of the first 
Gulf War (1991) where the success of the Jominian “AirLand Battle” concept 
again showed its validity,10 and by the influence of van Creveld’s Transformation 
of War.  
During the same period, proponents of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) were also joining to prove that Jomini’s principles were even more 
relevant than before. The information revolution would help “the new weapons 
[to] … make possible ‘near-simultaneous operations’ … The emphasis would 
now be on speed, not mass.”11 The RMA improved efficiency at the tactical level 
and between the tactical and operational levels; however, it did not integrate it 
with the strategic-political decision-making process. Therefore, RMA is nothing 
more than what Clausewitz pointed out when he wrote, “Force … equips itself 
                                            
8 Michael Howard and Peter Paret edited a new translation in 1976 of On War: Carl von 
Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
9 Bruno Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine (Paris: Economica, 1993), 250. 
10 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 207. “AirLand Battle” was a Jominian concept 
that placed too much emphasis on the operational level of war, however effective, but which gave 
a template for the use of forces from the operational level toward the tactical level and took little 
heed of the political-strategic context. 
11 Kaplan, Fred M. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American 
Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 50–51. 
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with the inventions of art and science”12 in order to contend against violence, an 
adaptation to new technologies, neither a revolution nor a new strategy.  
The late 1980s, however, brought Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s theories 
closer in armed forces studies and doctrine. The First Gulf War demonstrated 
how, since Vietnam, a general can run a war without direct intervention of the 
political level,13 as suggested by Jomini. The war also marked a continuity of 
policy, controlled by politics, as suggested by Clausewitz; this fact was proven 
possible by the teamwork of General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the strategic-political level, which allowed General Norman H. 
Schwarzkopf to direct the war at the operational level. The much-touted public 
partnership of Powell and Schwarzkopf neglected any mention of the real 
strategy put in place behind the scenes by those at the senior-most levels of 
government. This fact also demonstrated that effective political control is not only 
possible but necessary to avoid a conflict that becomes “mindless and headless, 
[as] it is then that war assumes that absolute form that Clausewitz dreaded.”14  
Such control sadly was not achieved in more recent conflicts. After the 
success of the First Gulf War and the ongoing RMA, the concept of “AirLand 
Battle” underwent an escalation and malformation that resulted in the new 
“Shock and Awe” doctrine (also known as “Rapid Dominance”) written about by 
Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in the late 1990s.15 According to these 
authors, 
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, 
perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing 
sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, 
strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to 
                                            
12 von Clausewitz, On War, 75. 
13 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. IV 
(Boulder, CO; London: Westview Press, 1990), 233. 
14 Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy, 865–66.  
15 Harlan Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 
1996). 
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the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been 
characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of “fog, 
friction, and fear.” In the Clausewitzian view, “Shock and Awe” were 
necessary effects arising from application of military power and 
were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist.16 
Such concepts as “AirLand Battle” and “Shock and Awe” are iterations of a 
Jominian concept, covered with a Clausewitzian sugar coating, to be applied 
from the operational level down. They are doctrinal textbooks by which training 
may be developed and conducted, but they are not strategy. Emile Simpson 
pointed out, in War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as 
Politics, that strategy cannot be defined in advance, and strategy is 
geographically dependent: “For the mature Clausewitz, policy came first; 
principles should be adapted to form an operational plan tailored to a particular 
problem, understood on its own terms.”17 Hence, doctrines prepared for 
symmetrical fighting in Europe may not work somewhere else—especially if the 
policies that frame the use of legitimate forces are not adapted to the peculiar 
environment in which the war has to be won. Andrew Bacevich put it more boldly 
in Breach of Trust: “With the passing of the Cold War, the last vestige of 
coherence [in strategy] vanished,”18 a sentiment echoed by Strachan, as well: 
“The rhetoric of the war on terror stepped in to the black hole created by the 
bankruptcy of strategic thought at the end of the Cold War.”19 
2. On Counterinsurgency 
Particularly in the post-9/11 environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
guerrilla and irregular war was more likely to arise after the end of military 
operations or even within military operations. The records of both the First World 
War and Second World War make this connection clear enough. An evolution 
                                            
16 Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, 19. 
17 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 135. 
18 Andrew J. Bacevich, Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their 
Country (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013), 180. 
19 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 109. 
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toward insurgency was foreseeable, especially when there was no contingency 
plan to ameliorate citizens’ everyday lives during the liberation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The liberator was now an occupying force. Once again, the local 
populace took arms to repulse or unseat the invader over time.  
Jomini acknowledged that an insurgency may be a “‘last and desperate 
resort’ of an otherwise defeated people,” but dismissed it; on the other hand, 
Clausewitz both recognized and appreciated it.20 In On War, Clausewitz explains 
the basics of insurgency21 and strategic and tactical problems for both sides. 
Long forgotten since the 1960s when first written, Werner Hahlweg gives an 
excellent summary in his classic article from the Journal of Strategic Studies.22 
Antulio J. Echevarria II, however, in “4th Generation-Warfare and Other Myths,” 
explains how the trinity of chance, reason, and anger and hatred—rejected by 
van Creveld as outdated—is in fact still germane to insurgency.23 
One can make an analytical introspection framework based on 
Clausewitz’s trinity to analyze deficiencies in counterinsurgencies. Within 
“Chances” can be regrouped the strategic blunders and their reasons; in 
“Reasons,” policy and strategic-political gaps, and finally in “Hatred” the societal 
effects. 
a. The Role of Chance 
After the events of September 11, 2001, Shock and Awe proved to be 
initially efficient in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least until the end of the military 
operations under Phase III. However, this concept did not properly address the 
problem of counterinsurgency and the realities of irregular warfare in either their 
classic or postmodern forms. The principles of Shock and Awe, with massive 
                                            
20 Freedman, Strategy, 179. 
21 von Clausewitz, On War, especially Book VI, Chapters VIII, XXV, and XXVI. 
22 Werner Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies 9 no. 2–
3 (1986), 127–33, doi:10.1080/01402398608437262. 
23 Antulio Joseph Echevarria and U.S. Army War College, “Fourth-Generation War and Other 
Myths” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 7. 
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American firepower working against an adversary using symmetrical means in 
his way of fighting—that is, with traditional armies going at each other—fits a 
Jominian approach to fighting. Sir Hew Strachan described the dilemma in 
Afghanistan and Iraq: “The military instruments to which they entrusted their 
intentions were, however, designed for somewhat different undertaking from 
those to which the armed forces of America and Britain found themselves 
committed.”24 
In the face of insurgency and terrorism in such places as Afghanistan and 
Iraq,25 the application of force is secondary to understanding the political, 
cultural, social, and economic dynamics of the environment that result in this 
resistance. The environment for insurgency is shaped by two major factors: 
politics and the targeted use of violence. Counterinsurgency is highly 
politicized;26 therefore, military means alone will not suffice to end the conflict.27 
Contrary to the school of counterinsurgency (COIN) that emerged in the United 
States at the time of the Iraqi surge around 2006, counterinsurgency is not a 
special case of war,28 but a continuum in the spectrum of violence. Insurgency is 
the pivot point between police actions and de-escalation of the conflict and a 
renewed escalation toward a “symmetrical” war. 
b. The Role of Reason 
To resolve insurgencies, there must be a two-way bridge between the 
operational and political-strategic levels for strategy to also be efficient at the 
tactical level. Hew Strachan, Colonel Gian Gentile, and Emil Simpson all argue in 
favor of this flow; their works embody some of the most informed and useful 
                                            
24 Strachan, Direction of War, 65. 
25 The misuse of firepower has proven to be detrimental in the past in other countries, such 
as India, Ireland, and Indochina. 
26 Kaplan, Insurgents, 164. 
27 Ibid., 159. 
28 Ibid., 362. 
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writings to emerge from the present era of conflict and strategic thought.29 They 
also illustrate the difference between the theoretical and practical approach to 
war of Jomini and Clausewitz. Because Jomini does not reflect on the effects of 
policies in war, applying his principles does not provide a direct answer to fix the 
two-way bridge.  
However, an answer can be found in the more philosophical approach 
taken by Clausewitz. In Afghanistan and Iraq, there was not only a problem of 
choice between Jomini or Clausewitz, but the lack of a plan for “Phase IV,” which 
resulted in the intrinsic demise of the Coalition.30  
c. Hatred 
A seemingly impossible task given to the armed forces, such as nation-
building, can be detrimental to the two-way bridge. To understand the 
perspective of the armed forces, the analysis done in the 1980s by Peter Paret, 
Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert in Makers of Modern Strategy is noteworthy: 
“[Clausewitz’s] criticism of attitudes and policies that he blamed for the defeat 
was harsh: the government had not used war as an instrument of foreign policy, 
but allowed itself to be isolated from prospective allies, and then gave its soldiers 
an impossible task.”31 Out of this impossible task was born the familiar myth of 
the “stab in the back,” recounted in Cobra II, The Insurgents, Learning to Eat 
Soup With a Knife, and other works—but refuted almost solely by Frank 
Ledwidge in Losing Small Wars.32 This troubling myth was already reinforced in 
Clausewitz’s time by the inertia of society, resented by the military: “The country 
                                            
29 Strachan, Direction of War, 23–24; Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace 
of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New Press, 2013), 118; Simpson, War from the Ground 
Up, 191–92. 
30 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 576.  
31 Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy, 191–92. 
32 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). 
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regarded the war as a matter for the army alone.”35 Societal inertia is the 
postulate of Andrew Bacevich in Breach of Trust when he reminds readers that 
only a meager one percent of the American population served its country in 
combat in the last decade-and-a-half, and few veterans today are influential in 
Washington politics.36 
On the other side, to understand the insurgencies’ views, Ledwidge, 
Simpson, Strachan, and Kaplan show how the misuse of firepower and the lack 
of restraint in the use of force led to a cycle of violence—a syndrome that recalls 
the U.S. experience of combat in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.  
In On War, Clausewitz had already identified this cycle: “We must 
consider [i.e., think carefully about] ‘repaying atrocity with atrocity, violence with 
violence!’”37 This violence leads to an unsecure environment in which trust and 
stability cannot develop the necessary conditions to move toward nation-
building.38  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The methodology of this research is qualitative and entails three phases:  
• to research the selected historical and empirical literature for the 
thesis, demonstrating Clausewitz’s influences or absences thereof 
in the last decades’ conflicts;  
• to map the path by which Clausewitz’s influences arose; and  
• to compare, contrast, summarize and critically assess the 
adaptations and impacts in policy, strategy, and doctrine focused 
on counterinsurgency for English-speaking nations as well as 
Europe. 
Since the 19th century, the subject of Clausewitz in U.S. strategic thought 
has been controversial, especially in the present generation. The majority of the 
                                            
35 Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy, 192. 
36 Bacevich, Breach of Trust, 35, 43. 
37 Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” 129. 
38 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 574–75.  
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literature concerning Clausewitz’s influences is descriptive and based on 
secondary sources, military articles, and historical accounts. Various scholars, 
journalists, and military leaders have recounted direct or indirect influences with 
more or less detail. Therefore, the second chapter of this thesis discusses the 
available descriptive literature focusing on Clausewitz’s influence in English-
speaking nations, with a primary focus on the United States and the United 
Kingdom until 2001. It appears that Clausewitz is alive and well in the military but 
still in direct competition with a more Jominian approach of war that conflicts with 
the traditional chain of command. The second chapter concludes that the U.S. 
armed forces, although using Clausewitz, still fight a Jominian form of war. The 
conflictual relationship between the operative and strategic levels of war 
represented by these two military theorists results in a dichotomy which is at the 
heart of the problem when approaching COIN operations.  
The third chapter briefly reviews Clausewitz’s influence on strategic 
thought in Europe. It traces Clausewitz’s influences in Europe in the post–World 
War II period through the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). During the last two decades, the United States and its European allies 
have demonstrated a divergence of views on multiple occasions on strategic 
issues, especially on how to approach the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. The 
third chapter concludes that, although the allies did not have the same strategic 
school of thought at the beginning of NATO, today they operate under a 
Clausewitzian, and not a Jominian, approach to war at a military-strategic level. 
The fourth chapter compares and contrasts Clausewitz’s On War with 
today’s literature in order to highlight similarities and differences, with a special 
focus on COIN. This chapter concludes that Clausewitz’s theories remain 
relevant within the whole spectrum of military operations, including COIN. 
Second, it proposes that COIN is not a separate art of war; rather COIN is a pivot 
in military operations along a continuum of violence. COIN operates at the 
juncture between escalation and de-escalation, and therefore it represents the 
 15 
“graduate-level warfare,”39 as General Petraeus and John Nagl remarked, 
because military might is not enough to solve the problem alone; a DIME 
approach is necessary.  
The fifth chapter explores selected effects, implications, and 
consequences for future military operations. It concludes that, in part, the 
answers to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were contained in On War, but 
were not recognized as such.  
Finally, this thesis concludes that instead of scholars debating whether 
Jomini or Clausewitz should have been followed in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is 
time to go back to Art of War and On War to understand their complementary 
relationship in—and to—the 21st century. Classic strategic theory retains its 
value, despite the changing face of conflict. 
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II. CLAUSEWITZ’S INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
BEFORE 2001 
Clausewitz’s entry into the United States was a slow process, like 
percolation, which has spanned over almost a century. Baron Jomini’s theories 
and thoughts comprise a majority of U.S. military thought and practice on the 
theory and exercise of strategy.40 Quoting John Shy from two decades earlier, 
Colin S. Gray remarked in 2006 that, “Alas the spirit of Baron Antoine Henri de 
Jomini is alive and well and inhabits Washington, D.C., It was the spirit of his 
theory that gave us a technical and utterly apolitical understanding of strategic 
stability during the Cold War.”41 Gray’s controversial but nonetheless accurate 
view of the matter derives from the foundation of West Point in the early 19th 
century, its board principally composed by such French immigrants as Claudius 
Crozet, Pierre Thomas, and Claudius Berard. At this time in much of Europe and 
in the young United States, French was the preeminent language of higher 
education. Thus, almost all military and strategy books at West Point were in or 
translated from French, and little if any attention was given to German literature.  
According to Bruno Colson in La Culture Stratégique Américaine, the 
French, and presently the English-speaking world, only discovered Clausewitz 
after 1870, with the wars of German unification and the foundation of Germany’s 
Second Reich.42 However, Clausewitz’s theories thereafter slowly permeated 
from the old continent to the new, principally through British writers and German 
immigrants. Eventually, they reached the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), at least 
in part. Key in this connection was the path blazed by General Emory Upton as 
an influential admirer of the German military school. Christopher Bassford, in 
Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815–
                                            
40 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine.  
41 Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime-Time for Strategic Culture,” in Support of the 
U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, July 2006, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-out.pdf, 4. 
42 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine, 50. 
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1945, does a remarkable job of tracing back how Clausewitz was received in the 
New World—and through which channels. However, Bassford does not really tell 
his readers when, in an historical sense, Clausewitz began to influence U.S. 
military thought.  
This chapter endeavors to build on Bassford’s work but with a specific 
attempt to identify when and how Clausewitz’s influence spread to the United 
States. Not surprisingly, Clausewitz first registered among scholars of war 
strategy, and his works have had enduring effects on several services of the U.S. 
armed forces as well as in the thinking and writing of notable military figures. 
While the reception of Clausewitz’s strategic treatises in society at large have 
risen and fallen in response with the American experience of conflict and with 
developments within academe, this chapter also traces the influence of 
Clausewitz in broader U.S. policy circles. Although Clausewitz’s percolation into 
the United States was slow, it remains influential at the three levels of war.  
A. CLAUSEWITZ IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
One of the first references to Clausewitz came from General Henry Wager 
Halleck, who some refer to as the father of the U.S. strategy, suggesting the 
central role of “writing from Clausewitz” in his Elements of Military Art and 
Science, published in 1846.43 The volume was used as a core text at the 
USMA—but it includes no excerpts, citations, or references from Clausewitz in 
the text.44 Similarly, contemporary scholars have debated the Jominian or 
Clausewitzian way of war during the 1861–1865 U.S. Civil War and thereby 
define Generals Grant and Sherman as followers of a Clausewitzian way of war.  
                                            
43 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in 
Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, &c.; Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, 
Artillery, and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton & 
Co., 1846), https://archive.org/details/elementsofmilita00hall, 59, 60, 154. 
44 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine, 72. 
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The historical record provides no evidence that these two generals ever 
read Clausewitz, however.45 The reason is simple: There was no English 
translation of this work at this time. The first translation of On War was done by 
Colonel James John Graham in 1878,46 thirteen years after the U.S. Civil War. It 
is thus unlikely that many American strategic thinkers had taken note of any of 
Clausewitz’s texts except, perhaps, by reputation. 
The advent of German unity in 1871 and the rise of a new generation of 
officers in the U.S. Army was exemplified by General Emory Upton. Upton went 
to Germany instead of France in 1876 and came back very much impressed with 
his experience at the Berliner Militärakademie in the young Second Reich.47 
Although there is no record of Upton reading Clausewitz,48 one may assume that 
he was certainly exposed to Clausewitz during his time at the Berliner 
Militärakademie.  
Only with The Principles of Strategy, written by Captain John Bigelow in 
1894, does an explicit and complete reference to Clausewitz’s On War appear.49 
This document seems to mark the turning point from the overweening French 
influence in U.S. military thought toward a more German-inflected school.50 
Thereafter, references to Clausewitz began to flourish around 1909, the date of 
the edition of On War translated by T. Miller Maguire and Colonel F.N. Maude.  
In the 1920s, in the attempt to adapt the experience of the Great War to 
military education, Clausewitz made his entry in the Command and General Staff 
School and at the War College and became obligatory reading to enter the War 
College in 1928.51 There also existed in the 1920s a fairly vigorous exchange of 
                                            
45 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine, 83, 154. 
46 According to http://www.clausewitz.com/bibl/WhichTrans.htm, consulted 4/27/2015. 
47 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine, 183. 
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German and U.S. officers in various roles, not the least growing out of the U.S. 
occupation role in the Rhineland, as well as the fascination felt in German society 
with U.S. industrial production. There was a limited, but no less important, 
exchange of German officers with the U.S. Army, as well, and there was a school 
of German officers who looked on both the United States and the Soviet Union 
(USSR) as models of war and society. The exchange with the United States was 
not nearly as intense as the secret rearmament in the USSR, but the American 
fascination adhered on both sides. 
1. Clausewitz and the Generals 
Authors disagree on the importance of the impact, if any, of On War on 
Eisenhower during World War II. But According to Colson and confirmed by 
Christopher Bassford, Eisenhower did read it at least three times in the 1920s, 
especially as his mentor George C. Marshall was famous as a figure who up-
ended military education and training with new approaches.52 Carlo d’Este 
reports that “when, toward the end of his life, Eisenhower was asked to name the 
most influential military book he had ever read, he unhesitatingly replied that it 
was Carl von Clausewitz’s classic study, On War.”53 
When Eisenhower was appointed Chief of War Plans by Marshall in 1942, 
Colonel Albert C. Wedmeyer was his second. The interaction between 
Eisenhower and Wedmeyer, who studied at the German Kriegsakademie in 
Berlin in 1936–1938 (where Clausewitz was a part of the curriculum), is also an 
interesting link to the Clausewitz’s influence in the 1940s, directly on the heart of 
the U.S. military system. On the other hand, Jim deFelice in Omar Bradley: 
General at War, suggests that neither General Bradley nor General Patton seem 
                                            
52 Colson, La Culture Stratégique Américaine, 208. 
53 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), 168. 
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to be fervent admirer of Clausewitz;54 nevertheless, Patton did read On War at 
the same period that Eisenhower did. Eisenhower, through his career as a 
general and as a president later, may mark the turning point for a more 
Clausewitzian approach in the country’s politics. 
Samuel Huntington reflected a mid-20th century view and its optimism 
when we wrote, “Military chiefs held too much power, which expanded beyond 
the military domain into diplomacy, politics and economics.”55 This fact is why 
Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur were successful in their time. In World War 
II, they could locally coordinate diplomacy with strategy, strategy with regional 
politics, then regional politics with the operational level within the strategic 
atmosphere of the United States. However, President Roosevelt kept them in 
check with the help of General Marshall, who personally knew both Eisenhower 
and, particularly, MacArthur; they had served closely in France during World War 
I.56 It is also noteworthy that both military leaders served together in the 
Philippines prior to 1940, Eisenhower under MacArthur, in the expeditionary 
forces. Their relationships were not perfect, but they did learn how to understand 
and to run a defeated and subject country, experience that eventually contributed 
to their success in Europe and Japan in 1942–1950.  
Clausewitz has left a mark on individual military leaders more heavily 
since the 1980s than before because the text existed in an easily usable form. 
For example, General Colin Powell recalls On War being “like a beam of light 
from the past, illuminating present-day military quandaries.”57 Melton hails 
General Schwarzkopf as “an adherent to the Clausewizian paradigm that 
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pervaded the army’s doctrine in the 1980s.”58 He has a similar assessment of 
General Tommy Franks: “Franks, like so many other officers of his military 
generation, was a Clausewizian.”59  
2. Clausewitz and the Services 
Although the Army was, through Summers’ book, the main transformation 
motor, it is the Marine Corps that adapted the most to Clausewitz. The Air Force 
and the Navy were also impacted at different level, but not as much as the 
USMC and the U.S. Army. 
Clausewitz’s real influence on the U.S. Army can be traced to the early 
1980s; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, largely influenced by Clausewitz, was 
instrumental in the conception of the “AirLand Battle” doctrine, on which “Rapid 
Dominance,” perhaps better known as the Shock and Awe doctrine, is another 
iteration. This concept is even more clearly based on Clausewitz. Although the 
concepts are Clausewitzian in essence, their interpretations remain more 
Jominian. 
At the same time in mid-80s, the U.S. Marine Corps, according to Major 
Ben Connable in “Culture Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational Culture and 
Adaptation to Cultural Terrain” was also incorporating Clausewitz in its way of 
war: 
The vehicle for transformation came in 1985 with the publication of 
Bill Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Maneuver Warfare was 
not a revolutionary concept. Lind essentially boiled down the time-
tested warfighting philosophies of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, 
and Colonel John Boyd and situated them in the context of the 
decentralized tactical theory of the World War I and II German 
Armies.60 
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Furthermore, Bassford confirms that the noteworthy 1989 doctrinal manual 
FMFM-1 is a “Condensation of Clausewitz”61 and therefore marks the point of 
entry of Clausewitzian influence in the modern doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Stuart Kinross argues that under the influence of General Charles Krulak, 
Captain John Schmitt continued to develop a more Clausewitzian view of the 
FMFM-1 with the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting and 
then the MCDP 1–1 Strategy authored by Christopher Bassford in 1997.62 
Clausewitz’s influence in the U.S. Navy is a little hazier because of the 
role of naval strategic theory and its connections to classical theory with an 
emphasis on continental Europe. Although Navy doctrine is based on Mahan, 
himself an unabashed advocate of Jomini, it certainly was also influenced in 
1905 by Clausewitz in an indirect way. According to Christopher Bassford,63 
Clausewitz’s writing may have made its way to the United States through articles 
from Rear-Admiral Baron Curt von Maltzahn, translated and published in English 
at the Royal Navy’s War College64 and by an earlier English translation of the 
Russian Admiral S. O. Makarov’s work on naval tactics in 1898.65 Such British 
admirals as Philip Howard, James Thursfield and Julian Corbett, who were read 
in the United States, were also influenced indirectly by Clausewitz in their work. 
Although Alfred Thayer Mahan based his work on Jomini, he recognized 
Clausewitz as “one of the first authorities,”66 even though he appears only to 
                                            
61 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 205. 
62 Stuart Kinross, Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to 
Iraq (London: Routledge, 2008), 190. 
63 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 94–95. 
64 Ibid., 244. Admiral von Maltzahn, trans. W.H. Hancock, What Lesson has General von 
Clausewitz’s Work, “On War,” for the Naval Officer? (Portsmouth: War College, November 1906), 
No.4 (Naval Library P806); originally Marine Rundschau, June 1905. 
65 Ibid. Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, Imperial Russian Navy, Discussion of Questions in Naval 
Tactics, trans. Lieutenant [USN] John B. Bernadou (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 
1898; reprinted Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1990). 
66 Cited in Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 95. 
 24 
have read it later, around 1910.67 Dr Steven Metz confirms that “the Maritime 
Strategy was Clausewitzian even though Mahan was the Navy’s patron saint.”68 
For the U.S. Air Force, Clausewitz appears in writings from Major General 
Haywood S. Hansell and also in the works of General John Ashley Warden III. 
According to Stuart Kinross, the 1984 Air Force Manual 1–1 reflects a 
Clausewitzian approach69 and moreover, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Watts and the 
fine work of Major Mark Clodfelter that debunked the air war in Vietnam based 
their reflections on the Air Force for their works on Clausewitz.70 For Bassford, 
the impact on the doctrine is “less clear,”71 but is still basically Clausewitzian for 
Kinross. 
B. CLAUSEWITZ AND U.S. READERS 
Clausewitz did not only capture the attention of the U.S. armed forces and 
their personnel; scholars also played an important role in disseminating 
Clausewitz more broadly. Few did more in this regard than the Stanford and 
Princeton scholar Peter Paret. Bassford seems to think that the group who 
participated at the “Clausewitz Project” at Princeton—originally an attempt to 
translate the body of Clausewitz’s work—laid the foundation for a larger interest 
in On War.72 Two other influential scholars also helped in this direction even 
earlier—Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State”73 in 1957, and Robert 
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E. Osgood’s Limited War,74 which Bassford considered “breakthroughs” in 
spreading a positive image of Clausewitz in the United States at a scholarly level.  
To illustrate how Clausewitz came to influence U.S. military thinking, one 
may turn to more tangible and visual data in our era of big data. A research on 
Google Ngram Viewer for Jomini and Clausewitz led to the graphic in Figure 1. 
 Clausewitz vs. Jomini in the English-Speaking World Figure 1. 
 
Source: Ngram Viewer,75 Analysis of the relative frequency of words in printed 
documents from 1800 to 2008 in books and in English for Jomini and Clausewitz. 
This chart is interesting first because it shows Jomini “losing” general 
interest over the years in favor of Clausewitz, who is gaining.  
Second, the peaks in Clausewitz’s popularity show some very interesting 
correlations. By 1909, the influence of the first English translation of On War by 
T. Miller McGuire is manifest in the first time that Clausewitz passes over the 
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Jomini line in terms of mention and readership. The progression continues with a 
first peak by 1917 or so, corresponding to the end of the First World War. Then, a 
diminishing interest amid interwar peace until the late 1930s was followed by a 
second peak during WWII; the 1943 edition of On War actually marks the decline 
of interest for Clausewitz in this period, coupled with the fatigue of the war, 
followed by a diminishing interest again until the 1950s. A new cycle, starting with 
the Korean War, marks the next increase in interest, with the next apogee in the 
1970s. Clausewitz’s prominence fell off again with the end of the Vietnam War, 
but renewed interest seems to correspond somewhat with Peter Paret’s 1976 
edition of On War. 
Paret’s work rendered Clausewitz accessible and affordable to the 
American public, who were in search of answers in the wake of defeat in 
Vietnam. The mood in the aftermath of the Vietnam War was instrumental in the 
spreading of On War through the military, scholarly, and political realms. The 
military leadership, eager to understand the causes of failure in Vietnam, used 
Clausewitz to delve into the nature of war and the causes of military failure in the 
wake of such victories earlier in the century.  
The most famous of these figures, Colonel Harry Summers, based his 
analysis of the Vietnam War on Clausewitz in a study produced at the U.S. Army 
War College that became a best seller.76 Summers’ work and subsequent efforts 
of other scholars in the 1970s and 1980s prompted a chain reaction at different 
levels.77 An example is the work of Stephen L. Melton in The Clausewitz 
Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
in which he recognizes the transition to Clausewitz in the late 1970s: “On War 
became the army’s new intellectual touchstone,”78 but he continues that 
“reinventing ourselves as nineteenth-century Prussians [sic] was perhaps the 
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worst way to resolve the army’s post-Vietnam crisis.”79 Melton argues against 
what he perceives as a resurgence of Romanticism for a more scientific way of 
war. 
Melton argues for a more “engineering approach,”80 in other words, for a 
status quo of technology and firepower as well as metrics in guerilla war that 
ignore the political. Robert McNamara did take such an approach and it did not 
work as expected in a time of managerial optimism and American strategic 
ascendancy. This intensely odd argument is totally ahistorical, as the system 
engineering approach that McNamara had manifested in his stewardship of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and Vietnam had itself been regarded at the time, 
by the Viet Cong as well as McNamara’s critics, as a manifest failure. 
Clausewitz suffered an abrupt loss of interest in the early 1980s until the 
publication of Colonel Summers’s work in 1981, reinforced by the second edition 
of On War by Paret in 1984, culminating again in the beginning of the 1990s, with 
the First Gulf War and general interest in war and politics in the waning of the 
Cold War era. 
By 1991—with the end of the Cold War, the rise of warfare in the Middle 
East as the central front of world conflict, the advent of the militarily 
inexperienced Clinton administration, and the influential book written by Martin 
van Creveld, The Transformation of War—Clausewitz lost his momentum for a 
decade, marking the beginning of the last visible cycle before the turn of the 
century. There followed a new peak after the events of the 9/11. Hew Strachan 
makes a further connection between causes and effects: “Because Summers 
was important to Petraeus’s thesis, so was Clausewitz.”81 In other words, 
Summers was instrumental to the propagation of Clausewitz’s influence in the 
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last generation of generals because of his significant role in 1976 fashioning the 
first doctrinal answer to the collapse in Indochina. 
In comparison, in the German-speaking world, Clausewitz appeared 
differently, as shown in Figure 2. 
 Clausewitz vs. Jomini in German-Speaking World Figure 2. 
 
Source: Ngram Viewer,82 Analysis of the relative frequency of words in printed 
documents from 1800 to 2008 in books and in German for Clausewitz and 
Jomini. 
In German literature, Clausewitz has tended to appear more frequently 
before a war, for example, in 1869, about one year before the 1870 Franco-
Prussian War. In 1911, the writing on Clausewitz start to peak again, three years 
before World War I, and the last relevant peak started in 1929, almost a decade 
before World War II started in Europe. Then two peaks appear with the start and 
the end of the Cold War; since then, he has been in decline. This trajectory 
shows a totally different picture from the U.S. patterns.  
                                            





C. CLAUSEWITZ IN U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY 
In the nuclear age under Eisenhower’s presidency from 1953 until 1961, 
Clausewitz’s ideas started to permeate through political decision-making 
especially concerning nuclear policy. Regarding nuclear strategy in the classical 
period of the 1950s and the 1960s, Henry Kissinger is hailed as neo-
Clausewitzian, as was Hermann Kahn. Scholars debate whether Kissinger and 
Kahn were Clausewitzian themselves, but if a link can be established, it is in their 
apparent understanding that a nuclear war was a continuity of a state policy by 
other means.83  
At this same period in time, the nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie became 
a central person as the historian and nuclear strategist at the RAND Corporation 
with broad influence on the U.S. services, especially on the U.S. Air Force and 
the U.S. Navy. (Not only was nuclear strategy influenced by Clausewitz under 
Brodie’s influence, but his later work with Peter Paret in the 1960s within the 
Clausewitz Project at Princeton and Stanford resulted in a series of publications 
on Clausewitz, including a new edition of On War, published in1976.)  
Inside the policy realm, perhaps the most striking result of Clausewitz’s 
rise is first seen in the post-Vietnam period with the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, 
which ultimately became the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine. Both doctrines are 
influenced by the Vietnam aftermath of irregular conflict as well as the 
institutional imperative to reconstruct the forces, and, of course, the work of 
Summers.84 They link military action with policy and the trinity. However, voices 
like Col. Philip Lisagor, among the most recent, in his article “Don’t Bring Back 
the Powell Doctrine,”85 argues that Powell-Weinberger86 was not Clausewitzian 
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per se, because it restricted the use of forces in comparison with other doctrines. 
These doctrines can also be said to not accord to the spirit or even the letter of 
Clausewitz, as they skew the center of gravity of reason far, at the expense of 
the sovereign, and also seek to regulate anger and hatred in such a way that 
ends up being alien to the work of professional soldiers.  
Nevertheless, Andreas Herberg Rothe, a student of Clausewitz specialist 
Werner Hahlweg, in is article “A Prussian in the United States,” dismisses such 
critics in light of the successor to the office of the Secretary of Defense:  
While the Weinberger-Powell doctrine understands war explicitly as 
the last resort of policy, that of [Donald] Rumsfeld could be 
summarized as: Do everything you need to do first. But this 
approach neglects any strategic dimension and especially the 
planning of the political and social circumstances of the situation 
after the war, the real purpose we are fighting for.87  
If the Powell doctrine was deemed difficult in rendering the strategic 
dialogue, Rumsfeld’s doctrine alienates it. In the same period, at the political 
level, the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 prompted reforms of the armed forces in 
a Clausewitzian way, arguing for more “jointness” in the armed forces as well as 
what hoped to be a consolidation of the high command, the assignment of 
greater say to the regional or combatant commanders, and a stronger role for the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The direct link from the president to 
the combatant commanders echoed the ideas of Clausewitz on political-military 
control and addressed the problematic role of the commander-in-chief, who is not 
the commander in the field, by the use of the Joint Chief of Staff as a special 
adviser. In Clausewitz’s words, “Unless statesman and soldier are combined in 
one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a 
member of the cabinet;”88 Goldwater-Nichols addressed this issue as well as the 
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enduring problem of overall strategy and theater operations in American military 
practice by reinforcing the role of the chairman of the JCS and the combatant 
commander (CCDR).  
Clausewitz also expressed that the military advisor should not only give 
military advice at this level, but also explains political repercussions.89 In this 
respect, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a demonstration of Clausewitz’s influence 
at the policy level of the state. First, the president has a direct link with the 
theater level, close to the operations in the fields without “serious loss of time,”90 
as recommended by Clausewitz, to influence military actions. Second the JCS, 
having a larger view of the situation than, say, an army or air force regional 
headquarters, may advise on the implications of military action on the president’s 
policy. However, Steve Willis in “Clausewitz and Corbett are Now Too Much” 
argues in a retrograde manner that the “defense reform efforts like the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reduced the power of service chiefs who 
traditionally formulated strategy.”91 This process is visible in the experience of 
the U.S. Navy in the last generation.  
Today, the service chiefs are force providers and are responsible for 
doctrinal matters with an emphasis on the operational level and not strategy. The 
shaping of the strategy is in hands of the Joint Chief of Staff as member of the 
“cabinet” that advises the president and the Secretary of Defense and ultimately 
of the combatant commanders who implement the president’s orders. In this 
respect, the link between policy at strategic level and military goals at the theater 
level is reinforced. What did not work recently was not a flaw in this 
reorganization at the JCS level, but the micromanagement from the military-
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political level in operational matters, as numerous authors point out, maybe the 
most influential being Fred Kaplan92 and Michael Gordon.93 
D. CLAUSEWITZ’S CRITICS 
Clausewitz sparks a visceral reaction among many critics because 
Clausewitz’s On War is analytical and not prescriptive. It does not contain a list 
nor does it contain the reductionist aphorisms of Sun Tzu or the diagrams and 
pleasing generalities of Jomini. The text imposes the need to think about war in 
its respective context, not to apply a recipe to win and because all wars are 
different in detail and appearance if not in their political nature, there is no single 
solution; like brewing beer, if one use the same malt, but a different water, the 
taste of the beer will change. People see Clausewitz or Jomini, but, in reality, 
there are few differences between Jomini and Clausewitz’ theories. The 
strategists are complementary. For example, until the end of the Vietnam War, 
one can argue that the American Way of War was primarily Jominian. According 
to Eberstadt’s report in 1945 and even Marshall later in 1956, American officers 
did not pay enough attention to the political objectives during WWII and their 
utility in military planning, with an over-emphasis on victory and firepower.94  
Corn also recognizes it when he wrote, with a nod to the ill effect of Field 
Marshall Helmut von Moltke and MacArthur, “the Clausewitzian Dictum remains a 
valuable warning, especially in an American context where policy-makers and 
public opinion alike are too readily inclined to think of war as the suspension of 
politics.”95 This fact is explained by the Jominian’s school of thoughts which as 
finally led to the Vietnam War and its result: “There was a lack of strategic 
integration: purely military solutions were not linked to political solutions.”96  
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This syndrome is best depicted by Summers’ exchange with a North-
Vietnamese colonel reported at the opening of the work On Strategy: “‘You know 
you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said the American colonel. The North-
Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be so,’ he 
replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.’”97 North-Vietnam won on the political level and 
this is what it is now remembered. War starts and ends on political settlement 
and is a wedge to influence in one way or another the politics of the adversary. 
This dichotomy led soldiers and others to see war as separated from the political 
as well as the social and the cultural spheres, with the known results in Vietnam, 
but also in Iraq.  
When war is disconnected from its political ends, the idea that technology 
and firepower alone can win the war, like during the Vietnam War, flourished 
again during the last decade. With too little attention paid to the imponderable 
and by betting on the technological advances of the armed forces, decision-
makers forget the importance of morale forces; thus, connecting war policy with 
the military realm did not attract as much interest.98 The entire cosmos of 
religious-inspired terrorism or guerilla combat has over-taxed much of the military 
thought, with catastrophic effects.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Flag officers who were in command during the recent conflicts of the so-
called Global War on Terror, like Generals Petraeus, Zinni, and McMaster, have 
also influenced the next potential generations of flag officers by their own works 
and publications. The adjunction of the National Security Affaires curriculum at 
the Naval Postgraduate School and the mandatory reading of Clausewitz’s On 
War at the Naval War College are only two examples of many that Clausewitz is 
recognized by scholars and officers as relevant even today. Nevertheless, one 
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struggles to pinpoint any change because of the number of documents and the 
cross-pollenization of ideas since the mid-1980s until the publication of the FM 
3–24 in late 2006. 
The relative balance of ends and means present in the Gulf War (1990-
1991) has vanished in the last decade, leading to a misreading of the kind of war 
in which the West has entered.99 This author would argue with Kaplan and 
Gordon that the problem was less the democratic institutional-political overview 
of the military based on Clausewitz ideas, as many argue, than a problem of 
egos of personalities in command at the time. Added to this fact is the natural, 
modern tendency of those at the operational level of war to follow Moltke or even 
Schlieffen in the attempt to elevate a subordinate level of war to the highest level, 
especially in the face of the ambiguities of violence and politics.  
To his credit, Corn calls for more “inter-agency jointness”100 to create a 
holistic approach to war. However, his proposal to shift away from Clausewitz, 
demonstrates a misreading of the methodology given in On War. Clausewitz was 
also adamant that his work was not doctrinal; rather, he said that it should 
educate one’s thoughts for the battlefield prior to an engagement—not 
thereafter.101 
However, the differences between the German-speaking world and the 
English-speaking world graphics in this chapter suggests that Clausewitz’s 
influence in the United States rose with a reversal of fate on the battlefield, which 
prompts questioning on how the United States “lost” a war but not the battles. 
The question embodies an apolitical and an engineering approach of the U.S. 
military culture that can be traced all the way back to West Point’s inception and 
the Jominian influence from the beginning of the institution which permanently 
marked the way of war chosen by the United States in the past century, as 
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argued by John Shy in the 1980s. But the engineering method of war in reality 
and war in theory cannot simplify the complexity of conflicts and requires a 
complementary approach to grasp the chances, hatred, and reasons of those 
conflicts. 
Even if U.S. scholars and personalities promoted Clausewitz’s On War in 
their own works, one may well argue that it is the force of war itself which led to 
Clausewitz’s influences being promoted in American thought, and not the 
reverse. As a sound source of theory formulated to the needs of thought and 
practice, Clausewitz still influences U.S. military thought by an indirect approach, 
based on hard-learned lessons on the battlefields, instead of a top-down 
doctrinal process prior to a war.  
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III. CLAUSEWITZ’S INFLUENCE IN EUROPE: THE ORACLE OF 
NATO 
In recent conflicts since 1991, the United States and European countries 
are working together in a “coalition of the willing” or under NATO. In this respect, 
if Clausewitz is relevant for the United States, he also should be relevant for 
Europe within NATO. Schools of strategic thoughts in Europe are many but over 
time, the mainstream can be found in NATO as it is the main actor today when it 
comes to European security. Therefore, a short study of this organization is 
necessary to understand today’s European view on strategy.  
The North Atlantic Treaty demonstrates Clausewitz’s core insight into the 
political nature of war as well as the dialectic of war in theory versus war in fact. 
Prior strategic schools of thought could not be pertinent to the needs of the 
Washington Treaty in the circumstances of the 1949 and thereafter as 
democracies pushed for a politically responsive and subordinate alliance system; 
hence, Clausewitz’s school of thought was, in this case, a natural medium in 
which NATO could grow. This military-political dialogue is visible today in NATO 
structures and in its way of waging wars and approaching crises. To sustain this 
claim, this chapter explores NATO’s past and its preparedness for defense 
(1949–1989) through its structural aspects. Then this chapter explores NATO’s 
use of force to compel adversaries during the last two and a half decades (1990–
2015) through some operational aspects and concludes that Clausewitz’s On 
War is visible within NATO. 
A. THE LONG ROAD TO NATO 
In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded as a means 
to extract and apply practical security and defense lessons from the recent war 
and to marshal the few available resources for the surviving democracies. NATO 
was born in a spirit of preparedness for defense by war-weary countries to 
counteract an ever-growing Soviet threat. In 1948–1949, none of the future 
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members could have stood alone before the Soviet “red bear,” which was 
anything but demobilized and thought to have nearly 5.5 million men,102 or 
roughly 200 divisions, ready to sweep into central Europe. In the wake of the 
political and economic measures constituted in the Marshall Plan as well as the 
Brussels Pact, more steps were needed in the trans-Atlantic realm to assure the 
security of Western Europe and its recovery.  
Continental Europeans, Canadians, Britons, and Americans came to the 
logical conclusion that an alliance was needed instead of a return to the failed 
diplomacy of the years 1919–1939. The choice of an alliance as a system of 
security and the defensive posture of this alliance can be seen, in a sense, as 
taking more than a page from Clausewitz. At that time, the security problem in 
Europe was reflected by Clausewitz’s trinity of politics, the political-psychological 
forces readying for war, and in mass politics.  
At the time, the American strategic school of thought was Jominian, in a 
conventional manner as the perpetuation of doctrine in military organizations is 
understood; this granted the French a legacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in American military experience. This was also true for the French. The 
British, another major ally, were following Basil Liddell Hart’s doctrine, which was 
anti-Clausewitzian at heart, as well as anti-continental, and oriented toward an 
indirect approach to conflict, in opposition to both Jomini and Clausewitz. The 
Canadians, being held between the geographical American’s hammer and the 
British relationship’s anvil, were and still are, not exactly Clausewitzian.103 
Finally, at the time of NATO’s creation, the West Germans were absent, only 
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joining the Alliance in 1955, as new allies. In the 1950s, the Wehrmacht veterans 
in the new Bundeswehr knew of Clausewitz, but the Bundeswehr still thought in 
operational terms in addressing the Alliance’s new strategic problems.  
B. PREPARATION FOR DEFENSE (1949–1989) 
According to Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre in Pursuing 
Strategy, NATO went through three distinct periods.104 The first period (1949–
1969), as seen in four strategic concepts, pointed to the need for defense. The 
second period (1970–1990) did not see a single new strategic concept, which 
demonstrated a certain stability within the Alliance, while during the third period 
(1991–2011), three different strategic concepts were published, the last one 
being released in 2010. This last period pointed out NATO’s need to adapt in 
order to survive. In this chapter, the author concentrates on this first period, while 
the next chapter deals more with the third period. The second period is not 
explored because of the absence of strategic concept.  
In their quest for a new solution to their security dilemma, the mindset of 
NATO’s founders reflects Clausewitz’s conclusion of Chapter 3, “The Genius of 
War”: “Experience and observation will both tell us that is the inquiring rather 
than creative minds, comprehensive rather than specialized, the calm rather than 
excitable heads to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our 
brothers and children, and the safety and the honor of our country.”105 As 
Clausewitz proposed, the Washington Treaty, also referred to as the North 
Atlantic Treaty, gave an “inquiring” posture to the Alliance, especially on other 
ways to promote democracy and peace instead of war. It gave a 
“comprehensive” approach; the use of arms control and cooperation gave a more 
holistic approach to a lasting peace. The establishment of an Alliance before any 
conflict led to a certain “calmness,” enhanced by continual planning and 
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exercises of the worst-case scenarios. The structure of the North Atlantic Treaty 
also demonstrated genius and flexibility inside the Alliance to accommodate the 
political objectives of its Allies as for the French example.106  
The first period of NATO starts with the Washington Treaty107 and the 
foundation of NATO itself. Looking at the treaty itself, certain articles are more 
relevant than others for the following analysis in terms of unveiling the spirit of 
Clausewitz; therefore, not all will be cited. In the introduction, the notions of 
alliance, defense and territoriality are explicit, as well as what is considered to be 
both a set of common values and a trip-wire if attacked.108  
Article One recognizes the body of international laws as fundamental for 
the North Atlantic Treaty and its operational legal frame which echoed 
Clausewitz’s “imperceptible limitations … known as international law and 
custom.”109 
Articles Two and Three stress the cooperative aspect of the Alliance, 
which appeal to Clausewitz’s view of alliance, allies and the trinity, whereby the 
methods of political life in democracies are included in the body of the North 
Atlantic Treaty extracted from the Marshall Plan, and attention to the balance of 
ends and means. 
Article Four gives the possibility for equal consultation, again with a 
political and pluralistic foundation.  
Article Five is the collective defense core of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
event of an attack. Not only the Alliance’s credibility rests upon this article, but 
the means and the end goals are explicit: “including the use of armed force, to 
                                            
106 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination 
(Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 90–91. The French withdrawal from the integrated 
military command structure is one example. 
107 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, DC: 
April 4, 1949), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.  
108 Thomas, Promise of Alliance, 72. 
109 von Clausewitz, On War, 75. 
 41 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”110 The passage also 
mentions the balance of means and ends, and makes no automatic, unbinding 
commitment, based on the negative experience of the Covenant of the League 
and the U.S. Senate in 1920. Not only does it foresee the involvement of the 
Alliance’s trinities in the decision, but it also attempts to focus on the capabilities 
to muster a “maximum exertion of strength.”111 
Article Five reflects what Clausewitz understood when he wrote, “The 
natural aim of military operation is the enemy’s overthrow.”112 The next vital 
article is the ninth, which calls for the establishment of a representative council to 
“consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty,”113 where all 
parties have to be represented. This article links the military-strategic sphere to 
the grand-strategy political sphere. In other words, the North Atlantic Treaty is a 
cooperative, defensive alliance under political control, which operates under 
international laws to maintain a set of values commonly recognized by the 
signatory nations. None of what preceded is Jominian, that is, there is neither 
emphasis on a single form of strategy as dominant in war, nor is the tactical level 
over-emphasized, nor is the role of politics simply excluded as a core aspect of 
war in reality.  
NATO’s Article Five reflects Clausewitz’s dictum that defense “is the 
stronger form of waging war.”114 Moreover, on the political level, the defense 
gives a message that emphasizes the link between force, politics, and ideas, as 
well as mass politics.  
The defense being at first passive,115 NATO’s choice of an alliance for the 
institution’s format and the defensive role it played recognized that “war serves 
                                            
110 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, art 5. 
111 von Clausewitz, On War, 77. 
112 Ibid., 579. 
113 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, art 9.  
114 von Clausewitz, On War, 359. 
115 Ibid., 357–59. 
 42 
the purpose of the defense more than that of the aggressor,”116 and reflected 
some of Clausewitz’s core principles. Alliances are formed of allies. Allies, 
according to Clausewitz, represent the “ultimate source of support” as long as 
these allies have “a substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of their ally’s 
country.”117 Clausewitz’s territorial view of defense certainly reinforced the 
necessity of unity for the European allies, but it does not explain the 
unconditional engagement of the United States or Canada, as an invasion of any 
European state would not directly endanger the North American countries. Is the 
interest of the Alliance really about territorial integrity or about something more in 
the realm of political imponderables?  
The signatory parties not only agreed on an explicit territorial defense in 
Articles Five and Six, but also on a set of common ideological values to be 
defended in the introductory paragraph. This approach of defense is reinforced 
by Article Four, which is also adverse to “political independence or security.”118 
Thus, the geography may be relegated to the background of concerns if the 
threat is more indirect than an armed attack. Ideology by itself is a basis for 
political decision and thus becomes a “political object—the original motive for the 
war,”119 as Clausewitz states. As a threat against the freedom of a distant ally is 
a threat against one’s own freedom in the near future, territoriality becomes less 
relevant than the political symbol under attack. Ideology intertwined with 
geography blended the “political and military objective”120 and reinforced the 
cohesion of the newborn Alliance. This point also explains the unconditional 
engagement of such faraway allies as the United States and Canada in “a 
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substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of their ally’s country.”121 This 
integrity is more than territorial; it is ideological.122  
NATO’s Article Nine reflects Clausewitz’s spirit within the Alliance’s 
military-political structure (secretary general as well as Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), North Atlantic Council (NAC) as well as Military 
Committee MC, and NAC and Standing Group as above the SACEUR, and so 
forth), and the consultative process needed to achieve any agreement inside 
NATO.123 If diplomacy failed to maintain peace, it would give way to the use of 
force, and NATO, according to Article Nine, would be acting as a war cabinet, 
and according to Article Five, as a force. As in democracy, where the statesman 
is not combined with the soldier in one person, the use of a war cabinet is 
prescribed by Clausewitz with the emphasis on the “cabinet’s participations in 
military decisions” rather than in political ones.124 In 1949, the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) was comprised of foreign ministers overseeing the Standing 
Group; later, the Defense Committee (DC) was comprised of defense ministers 
of the Alliance’ nations, answering to their respective head of states, who in turn, 
would oversee the Military Committee (MC)—chiefs of staff. These committees 
were derived products from the earlier Anglo-American committees formed in 
1941, which made coalition and alliance warfare possible amid problems across 
the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans and lasted until the end of war.  
When comparing NATO’s structures to Clausewitz’s idea of the political 
control of the military instrument, one can sees the parallel without difficulty.125 
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As Clausewitz puts it, “Unless pure hatred made all wars a struggle for life and 
death … no other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of 
view to the political.”126 In this spirit, the subordination of the military to the 
political is done by the NAC when it discusses and implements its respective 
government’s policy in the council. The dialogue between the NAC and the DC 
avoids the risk for governments to receive only “purely military advice,”127 which 
could be detrimental to the conduct of war. Finally, the dialogue between the DC 
and the MC insures that military plans are not “worked in ignorance of political 
factors.”128 
From the first structure of NATO in 1949 to that of the Council today, some 
structural changes have occurred. Those structural changes have enhanced the 
political129 and military capacities without impairing the political and diplomatic 
spheres. The 1967 Harmel Report,130 which followed “the Three Wise Men 
Report,”131 was finalized to enhance the civil-military side effectiveness of the 
Alliance, despite claims by endless critics to the contrary. Diplomatic and political 
activities have never stopped, and on the contrary, were expanded during the 
Cold War period and during any of NATO’s military actions, from the 1990s to 
today. NATO’s political and strategic adaptation to the changing face of security 
in Europe and beyond can be said to embody an understanding of Clausewitz’s 
well-known dictum that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means.”132 Nonetheless, the integrated military force under centralized command 
has maintained itself from the down of the atomic era into the post–1989 era. 
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Critics of the Alliance, who propose a hegemonic structure or focus 
narrowly on the mission, see the coalition as a means of breaking the bond with 
the political core of the Alliance and fail to see the virtues of the collaborative, 
political truth in Articles Two, Three, and Four.  
The Washington Treaty also relates to Clausewitz’s “paradoxical trinity” of 
the nature of war in fact versus war in theory,133 that is, in its different levels of 
war. The Alliance’s coordination of ways and means in a combined action reflects 
democratic statecraft and the realities of pluralistic politics. In its original form, 
Chances are in Articles Three and Five. References to what Clausewitz called 
Hatred may be found in the introductory paragraph and in Articles Two and Four. 
Reasons may be found in Articles One and Nine. The acceptance of the trinity in 
the foundation text of the Alliance is at the same time the acceptance of the 
primacy of politics over the military. This attempt to politicize the war, to keep it 
contained, and avoid an escalation toward its extreme form, proved theoretically 
possible in Clausewitz’s magnum opus and practically possible since Hiroshima. 
According to Articles One and Nine of the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
Alliance rests on the “self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth 
mentioning, known as international law and custom,”134 which gives NATO its 
structures and processes, thus, its own grammar and the logic for the link to the 
political and strategic level of war as part of the Alliance. Some can argue that 
Clausewitz was not advocating for the respect of international law, in which case 
they would dismiss the idea that NATO was founded Clausewitzian foundations.  
But is this the case? In “The Development of NATO EBAO (Effect Based 
Approach Operation) Doctrine: Clausewitz’s Theories and the Role of Law in an 
Evolving Approach to Operations,” Colonel Jody M. Prescott explains how 
Clausewitz advocated for the respect of international law in the historical context 
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of his time.135 The counter-argument would be Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, 
which started without an explicit United Nations Security Council mandate. 
Nonetheless, it started with the consent of a large majority of the international 
community under their responsibility to protect a population and to avoid a new 
Holocaust. However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo sees 
it as justified.136  
Ryan C. Hendrickson in Pursuing Strategy137 also reminds of the events 
that led to such action. By the same token, the tacit accord from the United 
Nations (UN) after the failure of Rambouillet and the massacre of Racak with the 
glooming prospect of ethnic cleansing did motivate the strikes under a 
humanitarian concern in order to avoid a situation as seen in Bosnia years 
before. In Clausewitz’s words, NATO used a certain degree of force that was 
scaled on its political demand toward Serbia.138 However, although NATO’s air 
strikes were deemed illegal, the deployment of the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) did 
happen in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.  
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C. NATO’S USE OF FORCE (1991–2010) 
During the Cold War, the Alliance’s goal was to avoid a conflict in Europe, 
which might have escalated to a nuclear exchange, thus re-enforcing its choice 
of a defensive alliance, despite criticism that NATO was inherently aggressive. 
Ultimately, the purpose of this defensive alliance is to compel the adversary to 
NATO’s will.139 In this respect, the Cold War was won without firing a single shot, 
in an “armed observation,”140 through the coordinated use of military ways and 
means supported by an efficient, coordinated diplomacy and in spite of significant 
crises. In 1990–1991, with the Kuwait episode, war returned forcefully to the 
diplomatic system. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO imposed its will on its 
designated adversary in a slow but deliberate process that was also inherently 
political and which applied limited force to achieve a limited political goal in the 
western Balkans. NATO used diplomacy as well as military might in a limited 
manner on the battlefields, which aroused much criticism among strategic 
fundamentalists and proponents of the operational level as the supreme form of 
war.  
NATO’s way of war was not always limited, at least not limited in theory 
and in the preparation for conflict. In Clausewitz’s vocabulary, it tended not only 
toward the “absolute form of war”141 but almost to an “extreme: a clash of forces 
freely operating and obedient to no law but their own.”142 During NATO’s first 
period under Strategic Concept MC 14, a massive nuclear retaliation certainly 
would have brought the political logic to a stop. In his time, Clausewitz asserted 
that “war never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread 
instantaneously.”143 But even this proposed policy of massive nuclear retaliation 
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was subject to political limits and the operationalization of the idea in practice 
required a political adjustment, say, from 1958 onward with the Berlin crisis.  
After the Soviet acquisition of nuclear and hydrogen bombs, the notion of 
limitations of war in the pursuit of minor advantages144 took on a new value; MC 
14/3, known as “Flexible Response,” came into effect. Within a time of reduced 
Cold War tensions that required the Harmel doctrine of the “dual track,”145 the 
political counterpart to MC 14/3, became a highly effective approach, employing 
both security and diplomacy.146 In NATO’s third period, after the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991, NATO revised its concept profoundly to win even more limited 
war if needed. It was the first time such strategic concepts were openly 
published, in 1991, 1999, and finally, in 2010. 
The view of NATO as a defensive alliance held during the Cold War, but 
may be questioned in the case of its interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s. 
Did NATO change its posture fundamentally? Did the change in the strategic 
concepts divert NATO from its defensive purpose? The answer is no. Following 
the downfall of the Soviet Union, NATO grew from its 12 original members in 
1949, to 16 (from 1982 to 1999), to the 28 current members. This growth shifted 
the principal focus to security concerns as well as the way to address them. From 
a conflict where the front lines were fused with the national borders of a 
neighborhood nation, the focus shifted to how to stabilize a situation that could 
potentially threaten the Alliance by a proxy conflict.  
The Strategic Concept (SC) of 1991 and the following concepts address 
such threats by enabling security by cooperation, crisis management, and conflict 
prevention. The SC of 1991 stipulates, “The success of the Alliance’s policy of 
preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the 
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effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises 
affecting the security of its members,”147 which reaffirms Clausewitz.  
In Paragraph 44, “Allies’ forces must be adapted to provide capabilities 
that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security 
of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means 
to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace.”148 In 1991, 
Bosnia and Kosovo were not in NATO’s mind—neither was Afghanistan. The 
Strategic Concept of 1991 essentially opened the possibility for NATO to 
intervene if a conflict threatened the security of an allied nation in order to 
preserve peace. The Strategic Concepts of 1999 and 2010 reinforced it. This 
gave the opening to an unexpected outcome at that time, which is the corollary to 
a shift from a territorial threat to NATO to a more diffuse and globalized risk, 
which the allies addressed under non-article Five basis in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, 
and Afghanistan.149 
War involves fog and frictions. The Warsaw Pact was generally easier to 
understand than ethnic conflicts and their ramifications, which would become a 
new environment after being forgotten for half a century. NATO, during its first 40 
years (1949–1989), was not so concerned about fog and frictions, partially 
because they were present in a lesser degree than today due to the well-known 
political and geostrategic situation. After the end of the Cold War and with 
NATO’s new role, these factors became more central to NATO’s achievements. 
On the other hand, during the Cold War, NATO was conducting a “war on paper” 
rather than a “real war” expressed in the physical world.150  
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The near absence of friction during NATO’s first four decades is thus 
explainable, as is the larger amount of frictions and fog since the 1990s.151 In the 
1990s, war became again a human activity in which NATO had a role to play. On 
the material side, NATO tried to minimize possible sources of friction such as the 
use of standard agreements (STANAG) and implemented recognition of friend-
or-foe systems among other choices. On the human side, exercises, training, and 
lessons learned were used to find and negate as much as possible the role of 
friction. Today’s frictions are less a matter of weather or a problem of night. 
Newer frictions have developed along with the technological advances that are 
supposed to eliminate the fog and friction in war. Today, a war without satellite 
communications is as unbelievable as the use of birds to detect gas attack during 
the first Gulf War due to the lack of alarm systems to warn the allied troops. 
In this regard, operational setbacks in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya 
can be explained at least partially by inaccurate expectations, overreliance on 
intelligence, and techniques that led the Alliance to misjudge the “kind of war on 
which they [were] embarking.”152 Additionally, the Alliance and its political 
leaders forgot momentarily that war is a “collision of two living forces” that 
interact in a constant manner.153 Action means reaction, and in the connected 
world of today, the reaction may not be localized in the conflict theater but far 
away, as the audience is now globalized too.154 Moreover, frictions also result 
from the Alliance’s multi-nationality and multi-cultural format, notwithstanding 
national interpretations of interests and needs. 
These aspects have received exaggerated attention. The advocates of 
military force over-emphasize the tactical and operational, in the manner of 
Jomini and others who elevate lower levels of war to strategy. These advocates 
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have constantly criticized the pluralistic formation of strategy as betraying 
timeless verities of war. These critics are, in fact, expecting ill-equipped soldiers 
within actual war to adjust to the changing realities of conflict.  
National frictions in a limited conflict such as the Balkans and Afghanistan 
are more visible than in a case of the invocation of Article Five. Clausewitz 
explains it in terms of the need of the political to mobilize the emotion of the 
masses155 in an operation with a limited political objective.156 In other words, 
frictions will be more visible, with the exception of the Article Five commitment, in 
which the survival of the Alliance and the way of life of its populations are at 
stake. Friction’s causes are less a matter of technology than a matter of time for 
negotiations at a strategic level. However, the consensus in the political decision-
making process is designed to overcome these frictions but can sometimes 
create operational setbacks, induced by inaccurate expectations and leading to 
unexpected outcomes.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, NATO is the exemplification of Clausewitz’s idea that “the 
destruction of the enemy is not the only means of attaining the political object.”157 
Therefore, it establishes the primacy of the politics over the military. Since its 
foundation, NATO has followed Clausewitz’s principles, although its principal 
founding members were not Clausewitzian per se, and some members—like the 
United States—would take time to embrace a more Clausewitzian approach to 
the military realm.  
                                            
155 von Clausewitz, On War, 88. “If policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the 
emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held 
back”: The political stirring is a cause of frictions. Such frictions have less chance to occur in a 
survival situation when article 5 is invoked (in which case it is not anymore a “minor objective”). 
156 Ibid., 81. “The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states 
and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate … a military 
objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in 
proportion.”  
157 Ibid., 95. 
 52 
The will of a group of democracies to survive through an alliance forced 
upon its foundation a Clausewitzian approach, which at the time may have not 
been a sign of will, but of necessity. Despite prior strategic schools of thought, 
the funding members, when confronted over national interests, came to agree on 
a Clausewitzian way. It is then not surprising that the North Atlantic Treaty came 
to exist through a strategic genius for handling of polarity and frictions. 
The natural choice of a defensive posture and alliance under international 
law imposed a respect of values recognized by the diverse trinities of the Alliance 
and supported by the mass publics at the time and which prevail today. From its 
first structure, its following evolution, and under the impulse of the Harmel 
Report, NATO finished strengthening its relation within the trinity by acquiring a 
subtle parity between Chance, Reason, and Hatred. This subtle equilibrium 
between the three is the key which supported NATO through the public 
consciousness, and permitted the survival of the Alliance158 when the Warsaw 
Pact died. Having incorporated politics and diplomacy, and accepted being 
subdued to it, NATO was able through adaptation to outlive the Warsaw Pact in 
longevity. 
NATO, by its construct and history, was and still is able to handle the 
whole spectrum of violence, in Clausewitz’s words from a “mere armed 
observation” to a literal “annihilation’s war.”159 Today, NATO has the means to 
handle limited conflict but is, at the same time, ready for the full spectrum. 
However, if NATO can compel and deter, the transition from military operations 
to a civil authority has, in every operation, demonstrated that NATO cannot and 
will not rule over the political realm and will stay subordinate to the political. If 
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NATO is the surrogate for war, then it fulfils Clausewitz’s concept of war as 
“merely the continuation of policy by other means.”160  
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IV. EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLAUSEWITZ ON 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
In the last two decades since the early 1990s, terrorism and insurgency 
have formed an undeniable link. Terrorism acts in two ways; the first is as an 
external factor to the main theater of operation. Its purpose is age old: to exercise 
some level of terror in the other camp and to exhaust the opponent’s will to 
pursue its action by exercising pressure on the people who are not directly in the 
combat zone.  
The second part of terrorism acts as a logistical base to recruit new 
insurgents for the theater of operations and to provide support for the “front.” The 
increase of terrorists in the theater of operations leads to a growth of the 
insurgency, which in turn tips the equilibrium of violence toward escalation. The 
logical tactical response is to escalate toward COIN operations. Terrorism and 
COIN operations are linked by the political realm, thus implying a coordination of 
the political with the military that, through a whole governmental approach, may 
resolve the root of the problem. Thus, it demands a top-down strategy. 
A. SHIFTS IN THE TERRORIST REALM 
The problem, for counterterrorist, with today’s terrorist organizations is that 
they are not as organized as before, like the West German Red Faction Army of 
the 1970s, for example. Today, there is no network, at least not in the traditional 
conception of a network. For example, there is no real chain of command, but 
only an idea on which terrorists act. To some extent, this new form of terrorism 
represents the absolute form of the “Auftragstaktik” with its absence of a direct 
command and control (C2) Network. It is an independent cell sometimes 
composed from a single actor, with no logistic ties and no indoctrination 
sessions. The new terrorists radicalize themselves alone via the Internet or while 
in jail, and then decide one day, without warning or orders, to act. They may 
regroup, but this is an exception, not a trend. Most of the time, they do not even 
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know that other potential “terrorists” are near them. Some join fighting groups 
abroad and then will be dealt with as an insurgency. For those who stay in a 
country to act, they are seen as “stay behind”159 actors; they are lone actors who 
have to be dealt with through judicial action. 
Through their way of life and experiences with society, they find a new 
purpose in their life. Whether they live in jail or die for Islam, they are “martyr-
heroes” in their own view in both worlds (paradise or jail). It is not a classical 
political combat in which terrorism was a necessity and a last action to help the 
cause. Today the political fight is replaced by religious dogma; this religious 
dogma is another form of policy —it is a religious fight for the supremacy of a 
faith, idealized or not. Killing terrorists, like killing insurgents, only helps fuel the 
myth by creating new martyrs, like the Christians in the past when Rome tried to 
eradicate them.160 
B. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TODAY TERRORISM AND THE TRINITY 
Carl Schmitt remarked in The Concept of the Political that “a world in 
which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, 
would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world 
without politics.”161 Like Clausewitz, Schmitt recognized that polarization created 
by politics is the fuel for violence and war. Politics should not be understood in 
narrow terms of left or right; politics are to be understood as a result of a human 
action toward a goal. Schmitt continue that “the justification of war does not 
reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought 
against a real enemy,” which enemy is a threat to one’s way of life.162 Insurgency 
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is an act of last resort for a segment of society to assert its differences in order to 
survive and to avoid that “decision to be made by another, [because] then it is no 
longer a politically free people and is absorbed into another political system”163 in 
which “it ceases to exist politically.”164 Clausewitz also come to this conclusion 
“with the retreat of the army into the interior—no matter how complete the defeat 
of a state—the potential of fortresses and general insurrections must be 
evoked.”165 Thus, insurgency is first a political act of survival expressed through 
fighting for its own way of life. Therefore, when a regime change is the military 
goal of a policy leading to a war, insurgency has to be taken seriously in the 
military planning, because it will, with high probability, arise. Hannah Arendt 
remarks in On Violence that “the emergence of a new society was preceded, but 
not caused, by violent outbreaks.”166 In other words, the causes of violence are 
grievances. Thus, independent of whether the regime change comes from an 
external actor, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, or internally, as seen in multiple 
revolutions, it is followed by counterrevolution, leading to change. As the means 
is insurgency, the end is the choice of one’s way of life, and the way is a political 
struggle. The assumptions of the relevance of the trinity—chance, hatred, 
reason—survives. Consequently, the survival of the trinity led Clausewitz to 
“consider general insurrection as simply another means of war.”167 That is, the 
insurrection or insurgency is generally not a matter of numbers; the roots of the 
insurgency are still the same. However, the military capacity is restrained to 
counterbalance the mean of fighting chosen by the adversary. Both the way and 
end of the adversary are out of reach of armies’ might. 
When in the middle of engaging with an insurgency, the missing link is to 
adapt Clausewitz principles. It is still a duel of will in relation to an enemy; 
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however, instead of the clash of two trinities in this trial, it is the clash of at least 
three trinities—the one who intervenes, the host nation, and the insurgency’s 
trinity—that clash altogether. To “win the hearts and minds” is to ensure that both 
the trinity of the intervening and the host nation are in synch against the 
insurgency. If there is already a discrepancy before, the outcome may not be a 
good one. 
For a third party caught in a host nation’s insurgency, the question is then 
how to influence the basic trinity (Figure 3) for each party when they are 
juxtaposed philosophically (Figure 4), and to shift the center of gravity, the 
population (c), which represents the hearts and minds to be won (Figure 5)? 
There are few solutions other than an overlapping of the trinities of the host 
nation with the one of the third party. 
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 Basic Trinity of an Involved Party Figure 3. 
 
 
 Trinities’ Interrelationship Figure 4. 
 
 
 Winning “Hearts and Minds” Figure 5. 
 
 
Even if done successfully, a fraction of the population (red) will still be 
unconditionally insurgents per se (see Figure 6), but the majority represented by 
the unconditional supporter of the host nation (green) and the “bystanders” (blue) 
will be receptive to change for a certain period of time. This window of 
opportunity should then be exploited to the host nation’s advantage. 
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 Population Support Model Figure 6. 
 
 
C. A POSSIBLE TRINITARIAN APPROACH TO INSURGENCY 
In order to militarily counterbalance the insurgency and its mean of 
fighting, one has to examine Clausewitz’s Book VI and his comment on the use 
of insurrection as a part of a war plan. However, it can be used in the context of 
insurgency as the rules will be the same. Clausewitz remarks that insurgencies 
are the result “of the breaking down of barriers.”171 Those barriers were the 
medieval estates in the face of the French Revolution and the decline of 
absolutism in the eighteenth century. The democratization of armed forces led 
the mass of people to put their hands on weapons and learn to use them, which 
in turn led to people’s war under Napoleon. Today, the democratization of forces 
and the availability of weapons continues apace. As Clausewitz remarks, such 
resources in war are somewhat limited, especially in insurgency, thus they have 
to be used intelligently to achieve a psychological effect.172 In insurgency, “by its 
very nature, such scattered resistance will not lend itself to major actions, closely 
compressed in time and space.”173 This statement is worth analyzing more 
closely.  
First, the adversary is scattered, which does not allow it to use mass. 
Second, resistance is a form of defense, according to Clausewitz a superior form 
in relation to the offense. Third, because the mass is denied to the insurgency, 
the insurgents do not have the capacity to either hit hard or decisively, 
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repetitively, in a short time or over long distance; this is why time is working for 
them and against the occupant. 
To at least reduce insurgency in the military form, the scattering effect of 
the resistance should be augmented. This has to be done by the use of the mass 
on the side of occupying force, however, without a concentration of mass, which 
would present an optimal target to the resistance. This is an argument against 
separate military bases and compounds and rather for more small outposts in 
large numbers in the populated area.  
If the resistance is superior because on a defense posture, the resistance 
has to be provoked into offense at all time. But in doing so, useless casualties in 
the population should be avoided. 
By denying the resistance of the mass of the population and by forcing 
them into action, the insurgents will have to expose themselves to achieve a 
result or disappear in order to avoid extinction. However, the goal at the 
operative level of war is to destroy the resistance, not to let it slip away. 
Therefore, the use of deception has to be enhanced to give the insurgents a 
reason to regroup in the hope of hitting the target of their choice hard and 
decisively in a single point; if successful, such a scheme can destroy the 
resistance, but it has to be credible, like Patton’s army in England. The other 
option is to disperse the resistance in such an area that it is virtually impossible 
for its members to regroup for long enough that the movement eventually dies by 
inaction. 
Clausewitz does not see a great difference in insurgency between a poor 
population or a richer one. However, in this case, we have to remember that 
force, at a strategic and operational level of war, has two components, physical 
and morale. The way to act on physical force will be the same, but the resilience 
of the morale force may differ greatly enough that a tactic used on a poor 
population may not work on a richer one, or the reverse. Nonetheless, the morale 
force in insurgency is a key factor. Clausewitz pointed it out, and General Tony 
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Zinni experienced it firsthand in Vietnam as he recalled, “to counter insurgents, 
we needed people’s courage, commitment, and rejection of the enemy,”174 while 
on the side of the insurgents, they needed “fear, apathy, or support. Any of these 
would do.”175 Fear can be addressed by the occupation forces by providing 
security; however, apathy or support for the insurgency will primarily be resolved 
by the political outcome, which is out of the hands of the armed forces; the 
people must go from being bystanders to becoming stakeholders. Zinni’s point is 
that the supported government has to “meet their [the people] needs.”176 
Clausewitz is definite, however, on the use of such insurgents, not 
“against the main enemy force or … any sizable enemy force.”177 There is a 
correct ratio between the size of the occupation forces and the potential threat to 
be found which can lead to an effective force protection and the security of the 
population. The use of insurgents may be predicted “to nibble at the shell and 
around the edges.”178 Therefore, the disposition has to be such that there is no 
edge in the military operation, but just a hard shell. This requires mass on the 
side of the occupant, dispersed in such a way that all potential targets are shell 
and work as a denial of area. As Clausewitz remarks, “the people who have not 
yet been conquered by the enemy will be the most eager to arm against him.”179 
If true, this fact implies that the occupying force should rapidly and massively 
occupy the convoyed territory to avoid the possibility that a resistance/insurgence 
can develop. The mass and the speed at which the occupation develop also 
have a psychological effect. However, contrary to the Shock and Awe strategy, 
the emphasis is more on mass than speed. At the moment the occupation starts, 
it marks the inflection point on the continuum of violence. This point is also the 
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moment where mass and speed no longer have the same signification for the 
invader. Earlier, during Phase III, speed is the main factor, supported by a lesser 
mass. After this point, mass is the main factor, supported by speed. In the case 
of Iraq, this point was the end of combat operations against the Iraqi army, the 
end of the “symmetrical” fight. If the transition occurs in a timely way, it should 
delay or avoid what Clausewitz called the propagation of the flames of 
insurrection.180 In other word, counterinsurgency should be seen as a 
succession of operations going from containment to attrition, as Clausewitz 
argues that insurgents “should not be allowed to go to pieces through too many 
men being killed, wounded or taken prisoner: such defeats would soon dampen 
its ardor.”181  
Finally, fighting leads to annihilation of the armed resistance. That is, by 
denying the relationship between regular troops and insurgents coupled with the 
denial of safe haven for regrouping, training, and organization through massive 
occupation, the lid would been kept on the boiling pot. For Vietnam and 
Afghanistan, the safe havens were North Vietnam182 and Pakistan, respectively. 
For Iraq, it may have been Syria or some patch of desert. In such a theater of 
operation, the insurgency is no longer able to use fear as a weapon to “arouse 
uneasiness and fear,”183 or as a recruitment tool. 
The goal is to deny the insurgency the capacity to build up enough forces 
to challenge the occupant in symmetrical fighting, for it is the only way to defeat a 
state. Now, containment, attrition, and annihilation are not necessarily linear 
tasks. In this respect, Clear–Hold–Build makes perfect sense in a military tactical 
view, but to be efficient it cannot be linear and certainly not only tactical. Zinni 
expressed the same for another time: “Vietnam was a simultaneous war, not a 
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sequential one.”184 If the military operation can take care of the armed 
insurgency, military units are not able to address the two other constituencies of 
the insurgency: the end, which is the choice of one’s way of life, and the way, 
which is the political struggle. In Zinni’s words, “the ‘whole of government’ must 
be committed;”185 however, the reality in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan was 
otherwise.186 Armed forces can solve the part relative to the “physical force,” but 
as Clausewitz pointed out, there are also “morale forces” to be taken care of.  
Insurgents can only challenge the occupying force in a symmetrical 
fashion if they have the support of regular troops. That is why it is vital to 
maintain regular troops under one’s command once they have been subdued. In 
the case of Iraq, as seen, the disbandment was a major error. The cleaning of 
the Iraqis’ ranks could have been done with time in an orderly fashion enclosed 
in a judicial process led by the host nation. Former enemies who were loyal 
servants to the host nation may have been pardoned under conditions which 
allowed a better future for all. Alas, what happened in Iraq just fueled the 
insurgency side. 
This fact also shows that the inflection point discussed before also 
represents the moment in which the political leadership should retake the lead of 
operations. The way of life for which an adversary fights is directly linked to his 
political view of his world. Therefore, in order to sustain military operations 
crushing the armed part of the insurgency, the political level has to coordinate 
how to settle the roots of the problems which have led to the insurgency in 
parallel to the military action.187 This can only be done by a profound 
understanding of the adversary’s trinity in his own narrative and certainly not in 
the “occupant” narrative. With slight interpretational differences, the 
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Clausewitzian approach could still work if it is broken down to a single unit. 
However, terrorists are not a military problem but a judicial one.  
The challenges lie in intelligence and coordination between the frontline in 
which the armies collect intelligence and the fusion with the rear, back in the 
countries subject to terrorism. It is a “whole government approach” which has to 
be efficiently coordinated. What changed is not war, but the way the adversary 
prepares itself in an intrastate conflict. Thus, counterinsurgency is a national-
level undertaking, as remarked by Captain Brett Friedmann, because 
counterinsurgency is linked to the adversary trinity and military means are good 
at tactical victories, but only a sound political strategy can transform tactical 
victories into strategic victories, hence, peace. As consequences, first, an 
insurgency is not a special case of war, it is just another expression of it along 
the continuum of violence. Second, the trinity is still the central element. Third, 
there is no military solution alone as the issue is rooted in politics.  
The first consequence impact armies on the planning level to avoid a 
vacuum of security which gives the essential condition for an insurgency. At the 
doctrinal level, provisions for the education and training of troops to conduct such 
tasks have to be made. As discussed earlier in this paper, the choice of troops 
and equipment is relevant to conduct counterinsurgency, which impacts the 
procurement level.  
The second consequence impacts first and foremost the framing of the 
problem and intelligence. Decoding the adversary trinity in its own environment 
requires more than data collection, and it is time consuming. In turn, the result 
will certainly impact planning, education and training, and procurement. 
The third consequence directly impacts the strategic level. Once combat 
operations are finished, the mindset is not war but police action. However, battles 
may still be fought. This is the “three bloc war” of General Krulak. Nevertheless, 
the precondition to start Phase IV on good footing has to be established all along 
the operation lines. As previously stated, the use of force is not contrary to the 
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use of the intellect. If there is an imperative necessity to destroy a target to 
achieve a military aim at one advantage, let it be. However, the information has 
to follow the line and feed the process to allow a rapid rebuilding once hostilities 
end to avoid this vacuum of security. This is not a linear thinking, but nested 
thinking which necessitates the support of all government agencies.  
During a speech delivered to the Association of the United States Army on 
October 10, 2007, in Washington, DC, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
stated, 
It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States 
directly on the ground--at least for some years to come. Indeed, 
history shows us that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, 
guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries found ways to harass and 
frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. … We can expect 
that asymmetric warfare [insurgency war] will remain the mainstay 
of the contemporary battlefield for some time.188 
He not only remembers well American history—and how the revolutionary 
war was fought against the British army—but also that “it had happened at least 
once each generation, and rarely by design.”189 The United States Army of today 
cannot be defeated by smaller countries with regular means, thus, insurgency 
war is the most likely to be fought.  
If war is approached under Clausewitz’s views, there is a rationale to 
explain Iraq and Afghanistan not as failures, but as continuity in the efforts of 
nations to reach national aims. This suggestion not only implies that war is a 
continuity of policies and not a failure of it, but also that war is a medium to bring 
people to the negotiation table, not to achieve such an ultimate, total victory as 
seen during WWII. The Western psyche is biased by its own history. WWII was 
certainly the most absolute war, but the memory of it diverges from reality. As 
absolute at it was, it is still an exception in history in terms of scale, purpose, and 
means. War in Iraq and Afghanistan or in other countries today are rather more 
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typical limited wars, in scopes and goals. This limitation of war is the 
counterargument to Bacevich’s view to imply the “home front” in the war effort. 
However, Bacevich, in the author’s view, still has a good argument concerning 
the need of a good relationship between a nation’s army and its population base 
on more than the minimal demonstration of gratitude; for the reasons described 
by Bacevich, in the long term, an all-voluntary force may not be the optimal 
solution. If war is seen as a failure of policies, the risks are that war will be longer 
and costlier than before, as their goals will be formed outside the political realm 
with the risk of extending their missions. Wars occur as part of human activity; 
the natural course of human history is not characterized by just war or peace 
because neither lasts long. Peace can just define a period of time between two 
wars. People in America have been at peace for a long time, but America has 
been at war every generation since 1776. 
Clausewitz remarks that “envy, jealousy, anxiety and sometime perhaps 
even generosity are the natural advocates of the unsuccessful.”190 This may 
summarize the downfall of democratic societies—envy to promulgate their set of 
valors, jealous of their exceptionalism, anxious of their past which triggers their 
conscience to share its goods with all.  
Shock and Awe is only Jomini’s operative half-way measure; to achieve a 
total military victory, one needs Clausewitz’s strategic political victory. War is 
started and finished by the political decision-maker, but wedged by its army. 
There are efforts to achieve victory: “This effort must not only be made, but be 
sustained like the upkeep of a great household.”191 Victory is not only defined by 
defeating the adversary army, but by its recognition by a sustainable peace 
treaty: “war and peace admit no gradations.”192 However, Simpson observes 
rightfully that “to define victory, or success, in one’s own terms … is generally 
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impossible.”193 Such treaties are necessary, but they were not seen in 
Afghanistan or Iraq in a recognizable form. Karl Marlantes, in his book What It Is 
Like to Go to War, makes a case for ceremonies, like surrenders or victories, to 
help consolidate narratives and reduce wounds. No such thing was done and 
broadcasted at the time in a discernable manner in the United States, save the 
odd image of President Bush in his flight suit on the deck of an aircraft carrier just 
as the actual conflict was setting in, despite all “shock and awe.” The absence of 
visible milestones permitted a biased narrative to survive and expand, creating a 
new problem on top of the older one. DOD Directive 3000.05 which recognized 
the necessity to “perform all stability lines of operation as ‘core mission’” was 
recognition that a lasting peace is also part of the military operation because it is 
the aim of all war to reach a better peace.  
The conflicts of the last two decades found their inceptions in a 
Clausewitzian world; it put adversaries that were not abstract at all against one 
another, and the wars were neither unexpected nor instantaneous.194 They 
developed upon mobilization of resources and did not consist of “a single short 
blow,”195 and intelligence, although more efficient than before, was still imperfect 
and sometime inaccurate, which maintained the fog of war196 on operations 
despite the technological promises of RMA and network-centric warfare. The Iraq 
and the Afghanistan invasions were thought and fought in a Clausewitzian 
framework but in a Jominian way of war.  
The seizure of countries was a necessity to achieve the political aim which 
was a regime change, but those countries were not to be retained as a prize.197 
This was done after “wear[ing] down the enemy” by containment, which brought 
Sadam Hussein or the Taliban to a “gradual exhaustion of his physical and 
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morale resistance”198 and by a short phase of attrition in which the enemy’s 
suffering was increased199 with the help of Shock and Awe. The Iraqi army was 
“coerced” and “put in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice 
… call on [it]”:200 the unpleasant situation at this point was to die for nothing, 
versus the sacrifice of surrender and stopping hostilities. In this respect, 
maximum violence used with the “simultaneous use of intellect”201 effectively 
renders “war between civilized nations … far less cruel and destructive”202 than 
what was coming during the sectarian violence. The Taliban followed almost the 
same trajectory as the coalition. From Phase 0, or “shaping the theater,” to the 
end of Phase III, or “dominating activities,” the conflict was Clausewitzian; On 
War was applied, if not directly, at least in spirit, up to the occupation. 
Then, at the moment when effective political influence regained its 
influence over military operations, one forgot that even if the occupation is 
completed, “hostilities can be renewed again in the interior.”203 The research of 
the causes and distribution of blame regarding Afghanistan and the Iraq War 
grew in the fertile soil of literature on Afghanistan and the Iraq War in the mid-
2000s. However, the answers were in On War; the military leadership did read it 
and mostly understood it, and applied it, as proven by the rapid success of 
military operations. The political leadership, however, did not listen to the advice 
of the military leadership. The failure, resulting in protracted conflicts, is to be 
seen at the junction of the military-strategy level and the political leadership,204 
not by the troops.  
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V. OLD NEW WARS AND THE ENDURING RELEVANCE OF 
CLAUSEWITZ 
After the 1990s, Clausewitz was widely read in all U.S. military schools 
and studied to some degree by all branches of the U.S. armed forces. He was 
read, but he may not have been learned in the manner that the needs of policy, 
strategy and operations can be said to have required in the time since. As of the 
year 2015, first-hand accounts of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are now 
published and discussed and generalizations about this literature are urgent for 
their meaning in the wider body of strategic theory, including its classical part. 
This chapter intends to follow On War’s layout, and to compare and 
contrast Clausewitz’s magnum opus with today’s accounts of the recent conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This chapter argues against Dr. Tony Corn, who, in the 
vein of van Creveld and Liddell Hart before him, states in the tendentious manner 
that fits the world since 2001, “It is fair to say that Clausewitz’s On War has never 
been less relevant as today.”205 In fact, the contrary is truer: Clausewitz is more 
relevant today than ever before and still misused in U.S. military thinking and 
practice. 
A. ON THE NATURE OF WAR 
In his introduction, Clausewitz warns his reader that war is a complex 
matter, thus, “the part[s] and the whole must always be thought of together.”206 
The parts of the war go from the soldier in the trench line to the commander-in-
chief in his headquarters, including all components of armed forces in the theater 
that keep them combat-ready such as logistics or intelligence, C2, and elements 
that may be located far away from the battlefield. The whole is as much the 
physical adversary as the rest of the world, which may have any influence on the 
war, even if remote in distance or probability.  
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In the introduction of his article, “Clausewitz in America Today,” 
Christopher Bassford states, in a quote more or less inspired by Field Marshall 
Helmut von Moltke, “The traditional attitude of American soldiers was that ‘politics 
and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where 
politics end.’”207 This sentiment was famously also quoted by Douglas MacArthur 
in his glory. Bassford cites the Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or 
Army in a Theater of Operations, edited in 1936. In the conclusion of the same 
article, Bassford cites Colin S. Gray from The Making of Strategy: Rules, States 
and War, in which the latter assesses some characteristics of the American 
strategic culture highly pertinent not only to the past but also to the record since 
September 11, 2001: “indifference to history, engineering style and dogged 
pursuit of technical fix, impatience, blindness to cultural differences, indifference 
to strategy, and the evasion of politics.”208 Fifty-eight years have elapsed 
between these quotations; the philosophical gap seems to be even more present 
than before.  
The conflicts in the two last decades have shown conclusively that history 
plays a role in the formulation of strategy; technology cannot fix everything, 
although it may help to save lives and to span geography; impatience by civilians 
and soldiers within other culture tends to be counterproductive; and finally, that 
strategy influences politics as much as the reverse: “To see the military as a 
politically inert executor of policy in a one-way system is to misread 
Clausewitz.”209 Politically inert does not mean apolitical. The Army should not 
help the makers of policy to understand the consequences of a military action in 
their politic sphere. “Apolitical” means that the Army is neither playing with 
politics for its own sake, nor defying politicians in their core sphere of influence. 
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Apoliticism has to be seen as a translation of the consequence of the military 
action into a political damage assessment type of service. If the army does Q, the 
consequences in the political landscape are x, y, and z.  
When seen from the perspective of the year 2015, the first influential 
mainstream text or manifesto against Clausewitz appeared in 1991, Martin van 
Creveld’s The Transformation of War.210 In his post–Cold War book, van Creveld 
rejected Carl von Clausewitz’s theories and their applications as obsolete tools 
which have lost their purpose with the end of the Cold War and which had little 
relevance in the face of terrorism, irregular war, and counter insurgency, which 
have manifested themselves with growing ferocity in the years since 1991. Van 
Creveld’s position then, almost a generation ago, had some merit, but for 
reasons pending adequate analysis, the idea of Clausewitz’s irrelevance became 
a dogma. Given whatever context in politics and government, not the least 
because of the personality of its author, Transformation of War was fated to 
influence military thoughts for almost two decade.  
This influence arose as conflict in this period diverged from that of memory 
and doctrine on a wide scale, especially so after the second Iraqi campaign of 
2003 at which time the disconnection between means and ends became fateful 
for the makers of U.S. strategy. This approach resulted in two main 
consequences for Western strategy: the first was the tendency by those in 
charge to see counterinsurgency as a new and separate kind of war; the second 
was to separate even more the military realm from the political realm, creating a 
vacuum at a strategic level that precipitated a series of blunders. Everyone 
today, reading newspapers or books or watching analysis on television, may 
develop, like van Creveld, the impression that since the events of September 11, 
war has changed in its most essential character of violence and strategic 
purpose. For Clausewitz, the nature of war rests on his trinity: organized 
violence, chance, and political effect. But can the nature of war change? If yes, at 
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least one of these factors has to change. The following analysis will test the 
validity of Clausewitz’s assertion of the constancy of war’s characteristics as 
described in On War. 
Clausewitz opened On War with his inquiry into the nature of war and, 
according to him, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will.”211 Armies still oppose adversaries in theater of operations and with the help 
of force, incapacitate an opponent. As before, the force “equips itself with the 
inventions of art and science.”212 Jomini, in the Art of War, validates Clausewitz’s 
definition regarding the lack of impact of technology on the nature of war, that 
“these principles are immutable, independent of types of weapons, time, and 
country.”213 One might suggest that in the context of the year 1991,214 an 
overstated faith in the perfection of technology certainly provoked a drastic 
change in military forces and their use at the tactical level, between the ones 
known by Clausewitz, and today’s armed forces; however, an incidental change 
at the tactical level does not change the nature of war at the strategic level.  
Despite all assertions by grand tacticians to the contrary, those military 
forces are still ruled by “self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth 
mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it 
[the military force].”215 As did the Greek poet Homer through his hero, Odysseus, 
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with Bie and Metis,216 Clausewitz divided military force into two distinct parts: the 
physical aspect and the aspect of morale. During the transition from industrial 
war in the total age to its nuclear and thermo-nuclear chapters, these two distinct 
part, physicality and morale, were replaced by a new dogma of technological 
primacy at the expense of chance, political purpose, and aspects of anger and 
hatred as a force of real war.  
The “Revolution of Military Affairs,” a 1990s invention of defense thinkers 
and defense contractors with little regard to actual war, took the field with a 
dominance of rhetoric which did not accord with political realities. Regarding the 
physical force within the military, ever more strategic idealists argued that since 
the beginning of the 1990s, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), had led to 
drastic changes in the art of war, leading to changes in strategy in favor of the 
United States and its high-tech armed forces that could limit the nature of war to 
exceed its limits with tactical finesse. The armed forces undergoing the RMA 
were also joining to prove that Jomini’s principles were even more contemporary 
than before, that is, the capacity to mass overwhelming force at the decisive 
point, ideally interior lines which now could be subjected to a single dominant will 
in battle in a “system of battles” as it came to be called. The information 
revolution would render through new technologies “‘near-simultaneous 
operations.’ … The emphasis would now be on speed, not mass.”217 Speed and 
mass as strategic factors are discussed later in the paper. Speed, not mass, as 
criteria is valid for certain kinds of combat, weapons, and tactics, but limited to a 
specific part of the war, known as Phase III. (Phase III relates to the physical 
                                            
216 Freedman, Strategy, 42. The best found description of Bie and Metis is from Edward 
Hugh in “Metis, Bie and Kerdos: Some Thoughts on Defeating Terrorism,” A Fistful of Euros: A 
European Opinion (Blog), March 13, 2004, http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/metis-bie-and-kerdos-
some-thoughts-on-defeating-terrorism/. Metis is associated with a particular form of intelligence 
cunning: “Metis is a type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but 
coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behavior which combine flair, forethought, 
resourcefulness, vigilance, pragmatism, opportunism and the wisdom of experience. When art 
and science unite, extra possibilities and opportunities are made resulting in innovation that can 
be driven by creativity. Metis is about finding elegant solutions to difficult problems instead of 
relying on brute force [Bie].” 
217 Kaplan, Insurgents, 51. 
 76 
destruction of the enemy forces, what came grossly to be described as “kinetic 
effects.”) Conversely, when it comes to stabilization in an area of conflict in which 
all-out force is unwarranted, the importance of these factors, mass and speed, 
are reversed. The RMA improved the efficiency at the tactical level or appeared 
to do so, and between the tactical and operational level; however, it did not 
integrate it with the strategic-political decision-making process. This problem 
grew more exaggerated as the political strategic level became murky, and the 
disjuncture of ends and means grew more aggravated in the face of actual 
events, as in the 1990s, and especially after September 11.  
RMA, as useful as it was, only focused on a part of war, and by the 
emphasis put on it, planners forgot the whole of the war in which the destruction 
of the enemy forces is just a small part of the war within the poles of violence, 
chance, and political effect, as well as anger and hatred. Therefore, a critic can 
well say that the RMA signified nothing more than evolution of ballistic accuracy 
as well as communications—an adaptation of armies to new technologies of the 
present information revolution in capitalism and communications, not a revolution 
nor a new strategy in the longer record of war in the western world. The physical 
force, available to compel an opponent is today greater, stronger, and mightier 
than ever before, but armies are still influenced by two main factors, speed and 
mass, and the same was true in Clausewitz’s time.218  
Mass and speed are relative factors and do not mean the same for a 
platoon leader or for a commander-in-chief, neither do they mean the same at a 
strategical or tactical level, or in the combat phase or in the stabilization phase. 
The factors speed and mass develop a different meaning depending on the 
phase of the war. The same is true when Clausewitz argued to “act with the 
utmost speed.”219 Once operations start, the utmost speed is certainly needed to 
exploit surprise, the practice of Shock and Awe of air and land strikes is born out 
of this idea. But speed can also be detrimental and lead armed forces to rely on 
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assumptions more than facts. “The slower the progress and the more frequent 
the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake, the bolder 
will be the general’s assessments.”220 To “act with the utmost concentration”221 
does not mean the same at the tactical or strategic level. Mass is not only a 
relative factor, but also has a relative value. A mass of old T-72 armored vehicles 
does not equal the same number of M1-A1 Abrams tanks; however, both 
represent a mass to achieve a tactical and or operational goal.  
The same can be said for Jomini and his principles of war. When we use 
the principle of war, Simpson, a veteran of contemporary war and a theorist in 
the classical school, argues that they are valid only within a conventional high-
intensity conflict.222 This author argues that it depends on how we look at it. 
Concentration of forces for example, is relative. Even terrorist have exerted a 
“concentration of force” in space and time to achieve a goal, as on September 
11, 2001. This “concentration of force” can be very limited from an army 
perspective, but still comparative to the means of the adversary as a 
concentration of force. Every principle can be seen through the lens of a smaller 
force and still be applied in combat. The scope may not be what we expect as a 
military unit. 
On the side of the morale force, Clausewitz anchored them in the state 
and its attributes “for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state 
and the law.”223 Today, with ideological conflicts of small violence that are 
intended to wear down moral and morale, morale force is much more important 
in the overall strategy of a state at war than before, because of the highly 
ideological nature of conflict, which might have been less so, say, in the epoch of 
the wars of the cabinets after 1648 until 1789. Today, states are bound to 
treaties, moral of actions are discussed on the public realm, and the result of 
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those discussions influences more than before the strategy of a state and its 
willingness or capacities to implement his military options. This is the question of 
the “just war” which has occupied a lot of thinkers in the Western states lately. 
But for Clausewitz, when he talks about force, meant physical force as the 
principal means of war but through On War, he pays close attention to the morale 
(which include moral) element as a whole, with his attention to the transformation 
from dynastic Europe to the Europe of nation-states. Today, the moral element is 
more prominent because of the codex of the Islamist fighter in conflict with 
globalized American capitalism in debate, and its influence is greater due to the 
connectivity of the world, phenomena that Clausewitz did not experience on the 
same scale, though Clausewitz was well aware of revolutionary ideology and its 
impact on the traditional state. Speed and mass are not only factors for physical 
force, they also influence the morale force; who came out with the message first, 
how quickly can this message be spread (speed), how many people will the 
adversary give his one message to (mass)? Such factors are relevant to all sides 
to establish a narrative and mobilize masses to influence opinions. The “near-
simultaneous” possibility of influence through mass media has reached a new 
high with cellphones, for example, rending more difficult the use of force. 
The true goal of war, once declared, is not to avoid bloodshed but to 
render the enemy powerless.224 That is achieved by the use of force. In 
Clausewitz’s time, force was generally equated with military might. Today we 
could extend those forces to diplomatic, economic, and informational, along with 
military force (DIME). This can therefore cover so-called kinetic and non-kinetic 
options. One, such as the British critic in the age of total war, Basil Liddell Hart, 
argued that Clausewitz advocated extremes of force and mass, however “the 
maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the 
intellect;”225 this idea proposes proportionality and restrain; it also allows the 
incorporation of a concept of (gradual) escalation which can serve the political 
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purpose of the war. The reason for this is that the proportional use of force 
avoids pushing the adversary to extremes by useless slaughters which can also 
be used to influence morale force. Maximal force without restrain will give 
advantage in the short term, but fail in the long run. Clausewitz makes a 
distinction between wars between states and savage war. In the case of war 
between states, the absolutist variety, is a “far less cruel and destructive than war 
between savage.”226 For Clausewitz, the reasons lie in the degree of civilization 
of the society waging the war and in its underlying motives being “hostile feeling 
and[/or] hostile intentions.”227 Hostile intentions are normally attributes of inter-
state war and are seen as more rational, while hostile feeling, which appeals to 
passions, are more attributes of what Clausewitz calls savage war. If the first 
type tends to rein in violence, the second propagates it. If hostile feeling are not 
contained and they develop into a “passionate hatred for each other,”228 war may 
tend toward its extreme form. In the present, one can suggest that such extreme 
forms can be seen in the treatment of subdued populations or prisoners of ISIS, 
for example. However, in the history of COIN, a prime example may be the result 
of the repression of the War in Vendée in 1796 and the resulting massacre. 
To render the enemy powerless, the aim is to disarm him. To do so, the 
enemy must be put “in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice 
you call on him to make,”229 and this situation should last long enough for the 
adversary to admit his defeat. The more recent problems, which Clausewitz 
would not have confronted, are the nihilist tendency of some adversaries at a 
tactical level and the blood feud concept of others which may have an influence 
at operational or strategic levels. In the last decade, a majority of the adversaries 
have sought to die for their cause, because in their view the outcome is better 
than life. This poses a fundamental question to define in this specific case: what 
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situation is more unpleasant than death? Clausewitz argues that is to render the 
adversary defenseless. In this case, the answer may be to be defenseless and a 
prisoner, or at least contained, as life would be more “unpleasant” than death. 
The knowledge of the enemy does not reside only in numbers of weapons 
systems or physical strength, but also in his morale force.  
Jeffrey B. Cozzens, in his article, “Victory: From the Prism of Jihadi 
Culture,”230 does an interesting analysis of such a situation and concludes that 
the metrics used with a Western approach cannot function in such a case. The 
protracted conflicts of the last decades are partially a result of the omission that 
“war … is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass”231 but as Fred 
Kaplan reminds us with a quote from Clausewitz, that the “enemy has a vote”232 
and the ally too.233 The analysis of an adversary must be done within the 
adversary’s own cultural sphere, as Colonel John Boyd explained in his theory of 
the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loops, not in another foreign and or 
abstract template. This idea was also expressed by Clausewitz: “you must match 
your effort against his power of resistance … the total means at his disposal and 
the strength of his will.”234 The means are the resort of intelligence gathering; 
however. the strength of will is not defined by a single number in an order of 
battle. As explained before, there is a cause-and-effect relationship as the enemy 
will is influenced by one’s will. However, Western states shall not forget that 
history may play a bigger role in the adversary’s will to resist than what was 
previously thought, as it has happened far too often: “This is not an opinion held 
by one or two people. I never met an Afghan who did not hold the view that the 
British were in Helmand to screw them. They hated the British viscerally and 
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historically,”235 and then Ledwidge lamented that the “unfortunate fact was the 
British had forgotten their history.”236 
War is neither sudden nor spontaneous, and causes are to be discovered 
in past events;237 the problem is they do not always seems obvious to the one 
who searches them, especially when this search is hampered by ignorance or 
cultural bias. As remarked by Clausewitz, the opponent is not an “abstract person 
to the other.”238 Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, or the Iraqi army and people 
were long known to political and military figures in the West, at least since the 
late 1970s. Having originated in Arab nationalism, fomented, in turn, by Nazi 
policy to the Arab world against Great Britain, as well as the U.S. strategy in the 
Arab world against the USSR, Osama bin Laden declared his “Declaration of 
Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places”239 in 
1996, five years before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The Taliban 
were supported by the United States against the Soviets following the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979. Finally, Iraq was not a new problem and was 
well studied in the 1980s, already a scene of war in the 1980s and in the famous 
case of 1990–1991, however, in this particular case with other ends and goals, 
limited in scope. Modern Iraq arose in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 
with the French and British conquest of this territory in 1914–1918 and their 
attempt to rule it in the interim.  
There is a tendency in Western civilization, because of wrong-headed 
military professionalism and civilian naïveté, to see war as a short and contained 
event; after all, World War I should have been over by December 1914 and 
started in Sarajevo to end in a swift victory parade in Belgrade or Vienna, 
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depending on whose side one was on at the beginning of August 1914. This idea 
is an error on two counts. The causes of the war are rooted decades before the 
assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and it lasted far longer than Christmas 
1914.  
War is not resolved in “a single short blow”240 and war is not finished 
before peace is signed by all parties. If signing a peace treaty with a state is easy 
to do at the end of hostilities, no one can say the same with insurgencies. 
Insurgencies, if they fail, tend to continue with meaningless fighting with terrorism 
tactics, before vanishing without a peace treaty. This is problematic to determine 
whether hostilities are really ended or just postponed, and can lead to a longer 
mobilization of forces than necessary; as Clausewitz argues, “in war the result is 
never final.”241 For a state to assure the best outcome, the theater must be 
stabilized long enough to ensure favorable conditions for a long and lasting 
peace. In some cases, the full might of a state cannot be applied in a single blow. 
As mentioned before, there are phases in war. The coalition did well until Phase 
IV. This is when politics junctures again with military operations, although 
because of the constant dialogue between both levels, a longer commitment 
should not be a surprise. 
For Clausewitz, “War is merely the continuation of [government]242 policy 
by [or with] other means;”243 meanwhile, Antulio J. Echevarria II, in Clausewitz 
and Contemporary War, equates “politik” to “international relations.”244 With 
Clausewitz’s definition, a case can be made for small wars; however, with 
Echevarria’s addendum, war can only be an inter-state war, which is plainly not 
the case in the record of war now and then. War starts and ends due to a state’s 
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policy toward a situation. The higher the importance of this policy for the state, 
the less a state will disengage from it. This is also true for the adversary. This 
explains why WWI and WWII reached the most extreme forms of warfare known 
at that time before the atomic era; vital national interests of multiple countries 
were at stake. Such situations also called for the unconditional surrender of a 
side to allow the other to survive. In recent conflicts, such vital interests for a 
state have not been present on both sides. This resulted in the Alliance by a 
lesser mobilization of states’ capacities and willingness to fight to the end; thus, 
for the alliance, the “policy is directed only toward minor objective, the emotions 
of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than 
held back,”245 a thought echoed by Andrew Bacewich’s in Breach of Trust. The 
same cannot be said for the insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan: their “national 
vital interests” where at stake, especially their political survival. Subsequently, 
political aims and military aims did not always converge, and due to a 
mismanagement of strategy, they were not sufficiently reconciled. In other words, 
the means used did not match the needs of the policy. 
War is also a question of polarization, according to the dialectic that is 
core to Clausewitz’s theoretical method to realize his ideas. For Clausewitz, this 
polarization refers to a single object. Only one side can win a specific battle; 
therefore, the other loses the battle. This fact is handy as long as both sides use 
the same measures of profit and loss for the same event. However, as 
demonstrated by Jeffrey B. Cozzens with Iraq and Afghanistan, the Alliance and 
its nemesis neither referred to the same event nor used the same referential. 
This reality led to divergent narratives. With the help of connectivity in today’s 
world, the core audiences were led to divergent conclusions. Such a situation 
produced a protracted conflict, because both sides were “winning” from their own 
perspectives or ways of measuring victory. 
                                            
245 von Clausewitz, On War, 88. 
 84 
The rapid operational and tactical successes from the Alliance first in 
Afghanistan in late 2001 and then in Iraq for a brief time in 2003 were not a real 
surprise. Shock and Awe functioned at the lower levels of war, against a 
symmetrical adversary, as its proponents would no doubt readily propose. But 
soon enough, the asymmetry in the ends and means for the combat changed as 
these conflicts became protracted and attritional as they naturally must do in 
nearly all cases. Clausewitz explains two factors which produce a suspension in 
military actions: “the superiority of [the] defense over [the] attack” and “the 
imperfect knowledge of the situation.”246  
As the Alliance’s nemeses were pushed back into a defensive position, 
they had, in Clausewitz’s view, the advantage of the defense over the attack. The 
factor time is working for the “defenders”; As the Afghan proverb said, “You have 
the watches; we have the time;”247 this fact was equally true in Iraq. Insurgencies 
benefit from the time factor when levied against the factors of anger and hatred in 
democratic nations, especially where an expeditionary army on a small scale 
wages such a war. Faulty intelligence, or faulty interpretation of it, in both 
theaters of wars, led to grave misunderstandings from reality; Ledwidge 
explained from his personal experience how bad assessments led to wrong 
actions and concluded “that was the reality. The virtual [his emphasis] reality, in 
which the military HQ lived, was that this was a well-run cordon-and-search 
operation.”248 The intelligence community does not particularly appreciate 
Clausewitz for his views on intelligence,249 but the Iraq case with the weapons of 
mass destruction controversy250 proved that, notwithstanding all new means to 
collect intelligence one can possess since Napoleon’s time, the result may still 
sometimes be blurry. 
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So far, the nature of war, as Clausewitz described it, has nonetheless not 
changed in the way that van Creveld and his acolytes in the present would have 
led one to believe. Technology has improved forces and changed tactical 
fighting, but it does not affect the underlying truth of war, the friction and the risk 
and chance native to war. General Daniel Bolger recognizes in Why We Lost that 
though training, good leadership, mission rehearsal, and certain 
equipment … help accommodate friction. Certain modern 
information technology proponents even claim to be able to end 
friction altogether through near-perfect situational awareness. No 
hardware or software, though, removes the tired, confused, scared 
human from the equation.251  
Friction and Chance is also evoked by Machiavelli in The Prince: “Fortune 
governs one half of our actions, but even so she leaves the half more or less in 
our power to control;”252 In order to control the second half, genius and courage 
are needed. The genius and the courage needed by the ones who participate in 
those wars still remain a part of it, as described by Clausewitz and still 
recognized by Gentile: “War at its most basic level is about death and 
destruction. Counterinsurgency warfare is no different, and its result on the 
ground can be as destructive as conventional warfare.”253 This is a truth that a 
new generation has learned at great pain, while the political class in the United 
States, at least in some quarters, partakes of this pain and suffering as a political 
weapon in domestic strife far from the war itself.  
The knowledge as well as intelligence remain principal factors to assess in 
which contest one is prepared to enter and ultimately, the factors mass and time, 
still makes a difference whatever technological edge one’s possess. On 
intelligence, Freeman remarks rightly that “with improved information gathering, 
Clausewitz’s advice to ignore timely intelligence now appears as more of a recipe 
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for disaster than a mean of avoiding unnecessary panic.”254 Technology insofar 
may not have totally dispersed the “fog of war,” for a part of it lies in the past 
events and the interpretation done of them. The second part lies in the policies, 
and not only in the battlefield, but the reading through the “fog of war” has 
improved since Clausewitz’s reticence toward intelligence. Adversaries still have 
a voice in the ballot and use it, today even more so, thanks to global connectivity. 
Finally, war remains a matter of policy, which linked hatred, chances, and 
reasons has before, at least since Thucydides named the “three very powerful 
motives… security, honor, and self-interest”255 Which led to war. So far, nihilism 
is the only factor not accounted for by Clausewitz that has been presented by 
some of today’s adversaries. 
B. CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY IN ACTUAL WAR WITH NON-STATE 
ACTORS 
Some will argue that Clausewitz’s interpretations cannot be used in 
guerilla warfare with non-state actors, since one cannot distinguish, in this case, 
between a state, an army, and a people. Such an interpretation fails to grasp 
what Clausewitz intends, with the idea of actual war as being made up of (a) 
political purpose, (b) chance, and (c) the passions of anger and hatred within 
psychology and politics. These elements constitute war in reality versus war in 
theory and help one to understand the two kinds of war in reality. This author 
argues that Clausewitz can be applied to a regional warlord as well as to a state 
with the caveat that the higher level of government must be weak enough and 
not to be able to enforce its own rules. Part of the key is given by Clausewitz in 
On War, Book Eight, Chapter Four. 
There is something basic to keep in mind here. First, terrorism is a tactic 
of fighting, nothing else; it is neither a form of government of any strength, nor is 
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it a grand strategy worthy of the name.256 Second, terrorists are actors who seek 
a political and ideological goal; if terrorist equals insurgent, their goal is to control 
a territory for their own sake. That means the insurgents research the attributes 
of a state to impose new borders in which they can rule with their own form of 
government and policies by the use of their own power, which, if recognized, 
becomes legitimate. 
In The Transformation of Warfare, van Creveld’s view on war seems to be 
inaccurate and as such merely embodies an old misreading of Clausewitz, 
especially in the British school of strategy since 1914. We may reject some part 
of Clausewitz, but the trinity is a way of understanding war in fact versus in 
theory, and the distinction between total war and limited war is central to all who 
want to wage a war. Clausewitz defined his trinity as follows:  
A paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and 
enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play 
of chance and probabilities within which the creative spirit is free to 
roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, 
which make it subject to reason alone.257  
The interpretation of this definition, however, may differ. Until the fall of the 
Soviet Union in late 1991, both sides, the West and the USSR, had a similar 
trinity, with the same interpretation. Army = army, state = state politic, and people 
= people (Table 1). With the Balkans’ wars, this trinity started to change for some 
actors as follows: army = warriors, state = political cause of one group, and 
people = a fraction of the population who supports a group’s causes. This was 
not a new phenomenon. The disappearance of the main threat gave voices again 
to smaller actors. 
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Table 1.   Trinity Interpretation 
 Until 1992 After 1992 
Trinity State A State B State A Organization B 
State (Ends) 
Will/Reasons State State State 
Political cause 








Army Army Army Warriors of group B 
 Symmetrical Asymmetrical 
Adapted from Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); 89. 
Therefore, in order to be capable of operating if the goal is to achieve a 
lasting result, any group, from a terrorist cell to a state, is based on a trinity. The 
“state” is the expression for what the war is fought, or the goal—usually a political 
statement (way of life, right to religion x, right to exist, right to justice, etc.). The 
people, as in “We the people,” are the economical basis to sustain the fight (war 
effort) and the provider of forces. Any group or organization needs them as 
supporters to feed the “green machine,” the army, with fresh forces. A state will 
call them soldiers; a non-state group may call them warriors. Whatever the name, 
it is not relevant; the function given to them is still to fight for the political aim. 
Therefore, in this view, every element of fighting is then Clausewitzian in essence 
and based on a trinity.  
However, we may talk about an asymmetry when we put a state in 
relationship with a group. This asymmetry is not a new phenomenon—think 
about David and Goliath. At a tactical level, even a symmetrical adversary 
researches asymmetry in order to limit casualties, which leads Conrad Crane, as 
a partisan of COIN and a well-educated officer, to say, “There are two types of 
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warfare: asymmetric and stupid.”258 By 1992, the use of asymmetric tactics had 
simply become more commonly reported in the organized violence that 
eventuated in that decade in Africa and Southern Europe as the Cold War 
vanished, and asymmetric tactics have been central to a group’s survival as long 
as the group does not have the same means as the state it is fighting. 
The asymmetry is related to the ways, means, and ends that the non-state 
group employs in a fight. Because of this asymmetry, at the beginning, the group 
using such strategy and tactics will not match the ones of the state, and may 
never achieve them. In this case a state is simply analogous to a police operation 
fighting a sort of terrorism (e.g., IRA, Rote Fraction, ETA, etc.). If the group rises 
and gains support, the state will then face a guerrilla or insurgency (e.g., 
Vietminh, Hezbollah, ISIS, etc.). Now if the group is effective, the state will face 
an army (e.g., UCK, NVA, etc.).  
As the group’s means grow over time, and come closer to the group’s 
ends, the groups tends to adapt its ways in a similar way to that of the state. For 
a group to defeat a state, during this fight, the group’s attribute had to become 
equal to the state’s attribute. If effective, the group will finally obtain its will 
against the state it is fighting (e.g., NVA in Vietnam, UCK in Kosovo). In both of 
the aforementioned cases, the groups could not have survived if other states had 
not come to their support. In other words, a new state can emerge only if other 
states authorize it (Vietnam, Kosovo, and South Soudan). 
We may extend the comparison to the era prior to the Westphalian states 
and follow it through until today and find similarities to the prior example of 
development of ways, means, and ends, but it seems that a comparison of the 
trinities involved in the conflicts and their respective ends, means, and ways is an 
effective way to do it. Hence, communal leaders, warlords, or presidents have to 
build their power on a “trinity” of “chance,” “hatred,” and “reasons.” Referring 
back to Table 1, such a trinity may also be called “government,” “people,” and 
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“army;” or “political cause of the group B,” “supporter of the group B,” and 
“warriors of the group B.” The same parameters of the trinity, such as economic, 
reliability, and popularity, also apply to any group fighting any state. If a country 
breaks down after an inter-state–type war and goes into a sectarian-type civil 
war, the main difference for armed forces is, instead of having to treat one single 
“trinity,” they may have to engage one or more of them according to the number 
of tribes or warlords in the theater. 
The “inter-state paradigm” (Figure 7. ) remains relevant if one does the 
exercise of mentally subdividing the trinity: for example, giving Taliban A a 
territory A, against which Coalition C fights, and in that period of time, Taliban B 
in the province B may or may not be neutral, ally, or enemy, and so on. 
Clausewitz principles apply independently for a physical state or, an “imagined 
state.” (For example, ISIS, Taliban in a province x in Afghanistan, Cyberpirat, etc. 
However, the “physical” state shall be defined.) 
War is a duel between two actors. These actors can be states, groups, or 
a mix of both. However, both of these actors possess a trinity, which may be 
influenced by the other; this is the reciprocity of war, according to Clausewitz.  




The terrorists or militias may not act with a single rationale259 because 
they are not a cohesive unit; militarily speaking, they were similar to a coalition 
with caveats for each actor. One may still speak about a “single war”260 as long 
as they display the same politic. In this case, “if you can vanquish all your 
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enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective in the 
war.”261 As seen in Figure 8, the political fragmentation, such as the one in 
Afghanistan or Iraq, is not a problem if Coalition A accepts the reality of the 
Group B fragmentation; thus, they shouldn’t be treated as a single adversary but 
as multiple and different adversaries. In this case, Coalition A has “to act as if 
there were two wars or even more, each with its own object.”262 In such a 
situation, Clausewitz argued for caution because the presence of multiple 
enemies gives them (Group B, in this case) a “consequently great[er] 
superiority.”263 
 Break-down of Trinities Figure 8. 
In some ways, this dynamic is shown in Figure 8. was the kind of fight in 
Europe before the Treaty of Westphalia, between a myriad of princes, dukes, and 
other actors more or less reliable in the transition from war in the age of the 
soldiers of fortune and merchant princes to that of the absolutist state. It is 
nation-building at its core. It is like the astronomer who observes a supernova 
and witnesses the creation of a new star comparable to the sun. The trick is to 
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adapt “A” trinity against the other trinities to achieve A’s goals. As a coalition, it 
can be difficult to have a chance of success unless the coalition assigns one 
different member to each trinity with overall coordination across DIME (see 
Figure 9). However, the OODA loops from each actor have to be understood in 
detail and acted upon in a synchronized manner by A in order to be successful. 
Assignment of Trinities within a Coalition Figure 9. 
Van Creveld, in his preemptive dismissal of Clausewitz’s trinity, halted the 
debate on its usefulness. In fact, nothing speaks against a plurality of trinities 
colliding and shifting alliances. Clausewitz may refer to a “bilateral polarity” 
because he defines war as a duel between two nation-states, hence two trinities. 
Two alliances such as the ones of the Cold War, are pretty rare in the global 
history of warfare. One adversary may be engaged at a time, but the second one 
may be on his way. This is when maneuver starts to be relevant to divide them, 
make separate peace, and conquer the rest, one at the time. The problem is 
such a way to work cannot support Manichean politics, neither global nor bold 
statements. It has to be tailored case after case, and it may be discussed 
multiple times; this marks a breaking point between military “strategy” and 
political strategy (or strategy.) Military “strategy” gives three options: winning, 
stalemate, or losing. But the political strategy defines them and gives playing 
room to coerce enemies into dialogue, especially if the political strategy allows 
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room for dialogue instead of unconditional surrender or death: “War is only a 
branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.”264 
When a rat is cornered, he will fight to death to escape. When he is 
bought by a nice piece of cheese, he may agree to get out of the house without 
damaging anyone. If not, there is still time to use a bigger stick. 
C. THE MISUSE AND MISINTERPRETATION OF “STRATEGY” 
Historians and scholars are fortunate, because they are able to analyze 
facts with enough time elapsed to allow them to form theories or a story line 
about a given event. After all, this task is exactly what Clausewitz proposed with 
his idea of critical thought being made up of the three parts: (a) chronology, (b) 
cause and effect, and (c) judgment.265 In the atmosphere of post 9/11, decisions 
had to be made and action had to be taken by senior U.S. leaders as much for 
domestic political reasons as out of shock at the apparent violence of an attack 
on the continental United States. However, fourteen years after the event, the 
first conclusion is that the Alliance failed to think about Clausewitz’s first strategic 
question in On War:  
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that 
the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that 
test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking 
it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its 
nature.266  
This statement implies first a dialogue between the statesman and the 
commander, as well as commanders who are versed in the varieties of war and 
in the appropriate military response at the three levels of war. Michael R. Gordon 
in COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq explains 
how such dialogue almost never happened surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, and Kaplan confirms that strategy was missing in both cases beyond 
                                            
264 von Clausewitz, On War, 605. 
265 von Clausewitz, On War 156.  
266 Ibid., 88. 
 94 
toppling Saddam Hussein and the assault on the Taliban.267 Second, Clausewitz 
implies that the assessment is done at all levels without forgetting the local and 
global role of history. Ledwidge shows how the history of British troops in 
Afghanistan in the nineteenth century was forgotten or ignored, as well as in Iraq, 
and he also points out that, despite all evidence at hand in its rich variety, 
Western states did not learn the lessons from the Soviet engagement in 
Afghanistan during the 1980s. However, today’s problem regarding strategy and 
history is addressed by Douglas Porch in Counterinsurgency: Exposing the 
Myths of the New Way of War, who remarks, based on Francis Fukuyama’s 
work, “History has lost the value to inform strategy, because ideology, 
technology, and doctrine now substitute for strategy.”268 The third implication of 
Clausewitz’s statement is that this assessment must be realistic in content, 
means, ways, end, and time; and fourth, that the main goal shall not be alien to 
the means; nation-building is not a military capacity.  
But before embarking in the details of strategy, the first clarification should 
be to reassess the meaning of strategy. Hew Strachan assesses the discrepancy 
between strategy, policy, and operational level and argues that a misreading of 
Clausewitz and a misunderstanding of the period in which On War was written 
has led to today’s misconceptions and mixing of concepts. “Strategy has been 
shaped above all by considerations of space and time;”269 strategy is about 
applying means to ends in a particular case. Thus, “strategy lies at the interface 
between operational capabilities and political objectives” and it is “based on the 
recognition of the nature of war itself.” However, there are caveats; strategy 
should be thought “within a particular theater of war”270 and “should serve the 
ends of policy.”271 Strategy is also a dialogue with policy: “Strategy is designed to 
                                            
267 Kaplan, Insurgents, 363 
268 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 333. 
269 Strachan, Direction of War, 11. 
270 Ibid., 15. 
271 Ibid., 12. 
 95 
make war useable by the state, so that he can, if need be, use forces to fulfil its 
political objectives. … it exists in relation with policy, politic, and diplomacy.”272  
 Interactivity of Strategy and Policy into the Realm of Figure 10. 
Diplomacy and Politic 
 
 
“Strategy” is almost certainly the most misused word today; in many books 
and scholarly articles, strategy comes as a direct translation of either Jomini or 
Clausewitz, without being adapted to today’s military vocabulary. Clausewitz’s 
and Jomini’s interpretations of strategy were closer to today’s meaning for 
“operational art.” 
With centuries passing, societal and industrial changes, and technological 
evolution, military vocabulary has adapted and become richer in terminology. 
Until the late 1800s, military planners referred only to tactics and strategy. By the 
beginning of the 1900s, in the vein of Helmut von Moltke military planners 
introduced operational art. Operational art retained a certain amount of the 
substance of the prior term, strategy, but not all. Until the beginning of the 20th 
century, strategy was mainly the art of moving self-sufficient armies from a 
staging sector to a battlefield. With the industrialization of war, although armies 
were doing the fighting, the logistic of sustaining armies decided the contest. The 
needed reorganization of the society after the mobilization to keep the “wheels 
turning” became a bigger challenge than drafting soldiers for the front. The state 
had to look to the bigger picture in order to keep the supply flowing to the front. 
Thus, to support operations, the state had to coordinate its industrial might with 
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its society, thus having an impact on its internal, external, and diplomatic politics. 
The art of winning war, “military strategy,” became a subset of national strategy, 
focused on aligning the means of the state to the ways of the army, to achieve 
the goals of the policies. Thus, the strategy of today is not Clausewitz’s strategy 
anymore.273  
Clausewitz defines the following: “Tactics teaches the use of armed forces 
in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the 
war.”274 The object of the war is a political goal.275 Clausewitz continues: 
“Strategy … assigns a particular aim to it [engagements];”276 thus, “policy, then, 
will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will 
admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.”277 Today, although influenced 
by the policy of the state, this statement is close to the definition of the 
operational level of war. But Clausewitz sensed that strategy was also more: 
“Dealing as it does with ends which bear directly on the restoration of peace. … 
As these ends will have to be considered primarily by the commander-in-
chief.”278 If Clausewitz admits that strategy can be done in the homeland capital 
instead as in the theater of war, he also warns that both have to be 
geographically close.279 In his time, the commander-in-chief was often the 
political leader of the country, bearing both tasks. When a political leader merges 
with a military leader, the state is closer to a dictatorship than a democracy; thus, 
this template is no longer valid in democracy without adaptations. However, 
“Only in the highest realms of strategy that intellectual complications and extreme 
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diversity of factors and relationships occur. At that level there is little or no 
difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship.”280 When continuing and 
exposing the “elements of strategy,”281 Clausewitz makes it clear that his 
definition of strategy is today’s “operational art” and not today’s “(national) 
strategy.” 
For Jomini, strategy is not only one of the “five principal parts” of “the art of 
war,”282 but it also encompasses thirteen points. The first two, “selection of the 
theater of war” and the “determination of the decisive points”283 may be close to 
today’s strategy. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini by his definition, willingly sets aside 
political and morale interactions; for him, this is part of the Military Policy284 
(political guidance for the army) and the Diplomatic Art,285 and he wished to 
concentrate only on the military aspects in his Art of War. 
Both Clausewitz and Jomini recognized the higher implications of such 
state’s instruments, as politics and diplomacy, economy and industry, people and 
morale. If Clausewitz linked the state’s instruments with war through his trinity, 
Jomini willingly put it aside; however, both concentrated mainly on what is today 
the operational level of war. Thus, both books, On War and The Art of War, have 
to be read today by translating strategy into operational art.  
Today, strategy is the “art” of coordinating the national policy with the 
diplomatic, military, informational, and economic spheres to mutually support 
each other. This is also the art of “tailoring” the interaction of these spheres to 
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respond to a specific problem.286 A strategy is unique and serves only one 
conflict. Moreover, strategy is not a static element; strategy is a “two way 
bridge”287 and needs a permanent dialogue between the head of the state and 
the leading military general (commander-in-chief). Strategy has to be coordinated 
to efficiently support the DIME spheres and facilitate their intercourse to achieve 
the main end state “with ends which bear directly on the restoration of peace.”288 
This led Strachan to postulates “Strategy therefore has to rest on an 
understanding of war and war’s nature because it will shape policy”289  
Policies should be linked to regional realities or military capabilities.290 
However, “war is distinct from policy,”291 but “once they are engaged in a conflict 
those policies are shaped by the action of the adversary,” as the enemy also has 
a vote, and “that interaction itself creates an independent dynamic, which is both 
incremental and unpredictable.”292 Thus, “policy provides the logic of war”293 and 
should answer “where were these wars to be fought, against whom, and for what 
purpose?”294 
Peace is a political act, not a military one; this also reinforces the role of 
the statesman on one side and the military leader on the other. Each has to work 
in his sphere, but the political sphere encompasses the military one; however, if 
the political leader gives the bearing of the strategy at a national level, the 
military leader stirs the operational level to reach the bearings. Strachan 
summarizes it well: “Assessing the character of an individual war seems to be a 
task for the military professional—is it regular or irregular, high intensity or low 
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intensity? But the answer has profound political implications.”295 This requires a 
constant dialogue and adaptation of plans between top military leaders and the 
political level—the two-way bridge. In other words, the micromanagement from 
Rumsfeld in the military conduct of the Afghanistan and the Iraq conflicts was 
more detrimental to the outcome, because it impeached the coordination of the 
military-political level and it impaired on the leeway that the military leadership 
must give in their own spheres of competence to be efficient.  
This fact is also not new. This is the Jominian approach versus the 
Clausewitzian approach of military control. However, at the end, both concede 
the same point. The political aim of war is given by the government. “Military 
strategy” has to be decided between both levels, political and military. But once 
the operation starts, the military conducts it, not the government. Sometimes 
during ongoing operations, situations change: “Professional judgment may run 
counter to political priorities, and that these clashes need to be confronted and 
debated, not denied.”296 When Rumsfeld said once, “You do the fighting, I’ll do 
the talking,”297 he was right: the political level communicates. However, it does 
not need to interfere in the fighting options. If needed, this interference should be 
done by a change of policy or strategic goal. To conduct operations, the 
government influences the military by changing the content of the political goal 
they are aiming for. This also requires that military leaders are apolitical in their 
jobs (not seeking personal interest through political intrigues). 
Using “strategy” at all levels only brings confusion, and the best example 
may be the “counterinsurgency strategy”; it may have been a “military strategy” in 
Clausewitzian or Jominian terms, or an operational approach in today’s 
vocabulary, but certainly not a national strategy, as Sir Hew Strachan points out 
in The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective,298 and 
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Emile Simpson in War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as 
Politics:  
Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan [or Iraq] is frequently described 
as a strategy. It isn’t. Counter-insurgency is an operational 
approach: a method which organises actions in service of a 
strategy, but not a strategy in itself … it can erroneously suggest 
that counter-insurgency doctrine can be applied regardless of 
political context as a strategy in itself, as opposed to being the 
operational component of a strategy.299 
The second part of the problem with strategy and the political interaction 
with the military sphere is twofold: first, even if Jomini recognizes the political and 
diplomatic dimension, he did not analyze their implications in depth in The Art of 
War; hence, he provides little advice to generals on how to handle the translation 
of the political will in the military might. Second, Clausewitz did in-depth analyses 
of the political dimension, and also the diplomatic implication by extension; 
however, little advice was given on how to coordinate the DIME. In both cases, 
their analyses were vertical. In the words of Simpson, “Jomini … writes about 
warfare rather than war. Clausewitz on the other contrary writes to explain war, 
shaped by society and politics, as it functions according to means and ends.”300 
The results of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts show this dichotomy. 
According to Gentile, “In Afghanistan, good strategy has been absent from the 
start”301; and Kaplan asserted for Iraq that the main finding of the Wolfowitz team 
in Iraq in January 2004 was “that American forces had no [Kaplan’s emphasis] 
overall strategy.”302 General George Casey, in May 2004, complained along the 
same lines, as did Condoleezza Rice in May 2006, three years into the conflict. 
This is also what the future president would hear from Admiral Mike Mullen 
concerning Afghanistan in November 2008 during the transition, seven years into 
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the conflict.303 In both cases, as long as it was only a military matter at the 
operational level, allied forces were successful until the end of Phase III. Jomini 
is, after all, the most studied military thinker in U.S. military circles and “Phase IV 
worries America.”304 Stuart Kinross in Clausewitz in America remarks that “the 
lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggest that the U.S. may 
have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam.”305  
As soon as the political and diplomatic level had to merge on the theater 
of war, there was no more strategy at national level, as Kaplan in The Insurgents 
and Gordon in Cobra II analyze in their books.306 Clausewitz, although he was 
widely studied in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, lost influence after the Gulf 
War of 1990–1991 and its success on the strategic and operational levels. As 
Gordon remarked, “The public debate over COIN’s utility in contemporary conflict 
suffers from confusion as to whether COIN is an operational approach, a strategy 
or a policy.”307 Consequently, everybody was talking about “strategy,” but 
meaning “operational level,” and did not coordinate with the political-decision-
making level in a coherent way. This situation also eventually led to a 
misevaluation of the kind of war in which troops were sent into. The war that 
started had changed by the end of the opening campaigns. The meaning of this 
change was not seized upon by those responsible for the formation of strategy 
and for its political legitimacy under the constitution. As Freedman reminds us, 
strategy is to “take a view of the system as a whole and assess the position of 
the individual parts.”308 
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D. PURPOSE AND MEANS OF WAR 
For Clausewitz, three broad objectives can summarize the activities of 
war: destroying the fighting capacities of the adversary, occupying the country to 
impair the enemy’s capacities to rebuild, and breaking the enemy’s will so the 
war can end.309 However, the corollary can be that although a territory may be 
occupied, resistance can occur inside, with or without the help of an ally. In 
Clausewitz words “not every war necessarily leads to a final decision and 
settlement.”310  
In Iraq, the fighting forces (Iraqi army) were destroyed and brought under 
submission. The country was occupied. However, the will of the resistance was 
not totally broken. Clausewitz continues, “But the aim of disarming the enemy is 
in fact not always encountered in reality and need not be fully achieved as a 
condition of peace.”311 Even if Clausewitz does not take the enemy’s 
disarmament as a law, it may be preferable in some cases because it can 
shorten the engagement. In the Iraq case, the aim was a regime change, not to 
retain Iraq as a prize. This was a political alternative to a military campaign. By 
removing Saddam Hussein, the will of the adversary was destroyed, and Iraq 
could be occupied. Occupation is a risky business today as it has been in the 
past: “We may occupy a country completely, but hostilities can be renewed again 
in the interior, or perhaps with allied help.”312 The adversary was not the Iraqi 
army per se, but Saddam Hussein; thus, the disbandment of the Iraqi army by 
Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer with the “Coalition Provisional Authority Order 
Number 2”313 created a new adversary with a new will of resistance, despite the 
fact that the alliance needed the Iraqi Army to secure the country. Bremer 
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ignored the idea that “disarming the enemy … is in fact not always encountered 
in reality, and need not be fully achieved as a condition of peace.”314 As the 
country was occupied and even more insecure than before, it gave the 
precondition needed for insurgency to arise. Unlike the insurgencies in China and 
Vietnam, which operated as one unit, Iraq and Afghanistan, due to their societal 
model, produced multiple insurgencies, all with different agendas. But the 
mechanism that brought them into existence is the same as for the October 
Revolution of 1917 or Mao’s seizure of power. First, they all profited from a 
vacuum of power (absence of the Tsar armies, withdrawal from the Red army out 
of Manchuria), leading to a vacuum of security; second, they all profited from 
weapons left by the previous armies. In the Iraqi case, the absence of security at 
the end of a military operation and the disbandment of the Iraqi army provided 
the conditions for insurgency to occur. This also occurred in Afghanistan to some 
extent due to the removal of some warlords and the Taliban, who were providing 
better security than the Afghan police.315  
Like in China and Vietnam, the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan had the 
means to develop. Insurgent groups fight for ideology, power, or other intents 
such as killing the infidel, but at the end of the fight, the gain will be measured in 
square meters gained over the enemy. The end game for an insurgent in 
Afghanistan, in Iraq, or even for ISIS is to be able to rule a country physically 
delimited, a province, a city, or a caliphate. The insurgency phase is a pivot. If 
things are done properly, the peace is achievable; if not done properly, it can be 
painfully problematic. Clausewitz explains why insurgents benefit from the time 
factor: the advantage of the defense. This is when the insurgents build up their 
forces, test their enemy, and learn their trade at fighting to be able to move on 
the offensive, because if the insurgents want to finally control their territory, they 
have to move to the offense in a later phase. However, during this period, the 
enemy acquires an advantage which “need only be enough to balance [his 
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emphasis] any superiority the [insurgent’s] opponent may possess: in the end his 
political object will not seem worth the efforts of it cost.”316  
This is exactly what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. The adversaries of 
the coalition balanced the advantage of the coalition. And, unwillingly, the 
coalition helped, because it did not provide security directly after the termination 
of Phase III. Kilcullen also recognized this problem:  
If you fail to create a basic minimum level of security and 
predictability for ordinary people on the street, it doesn’t matter 
what else you try to do, because none of it is ever likely to happens 
… it’s impossible … to get to the underlying issues that need to be 
addressed.317 
The absence of security was inexplicable and detrimental. Abraham H. 
Maslow, the American psychologist, has explained the “hierarchy of needs”318 in 
1943, using the well-known image of a pyramid. The base of this pyramid is the 
physiological needs of a human being, directly followed by safety, and then 
upwards until a person can reach self-actualization at the top of the five stages. 
This alone should be sufficient for any planner to understand the need to provide 
security to restore a viable society without a vacuum of power between Phase III 
and Phase IV. Sir Ian Forbes in “Future Warfare and the Principles of War” 
remarks that in 2005, “The troop-to-population density in Afghanistan is currently 
100 times less than Bosnia or Kosovo at the same, post-conflict phase.”319 This 
deficiency is explained by the will of the Pentagon political chiefs to have a 
“leaner” force for fighting. Fighting is a different process than stabilization, which 
has different needs. A leaner force did the job, and did it well. But directly behind 
should have been an additional force to take over the safety of the people at the 
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core. In peacetime in Washington, DC, in 2010, the officer-to-citizen ratio was 
65.5 to 10,000.320 The population of Iraq was almost 31 million.321 At this rate, 
Iraq would have needed more than 202,000 trained officers patrolling the streets; 
this number does not count for the “police employee” siting in an office or in a 
ministry. Globalsecurity.org reports, “As of May 31, 2010, there were 
approximately 297,000 provincial police forces (IPS and Iraqi Civil Defense 
Directorate)”;322 this is assumed to be a total of officers and employees. The 
question is, why were there so few soldiers patrolling? Notwithstanding that, if 
John McGrath was correct when he said, “However, by 2005 noncombat 
elements had risen proportionally to three fourths of the force size, primarily 
because of the mass employment of civilian contractors in Iraq in the new 
millennium,”323 with the tail-to-tooth ratio of ¾ at the tail and ¼ at the front, the 
question of Clausewitz’s “mass” is certainly central. For the 202,000 officers at 
the front, the rear would have been a mere 600,000 or a total of almost 800,000 
men fielded. Washington, DC, is the U.S. city with the most police officers per 
capita. But even in Detroit, which has roughly half the number of police officers 
than Washington, DC, the number of military personal would have been more 
than what was present at the time in Iraq. The invasion worked out with a lean 
force, but not the stabilization; General Shinseki and others were right in their 
estimations prior to the Iraq Invasion, and Rumsfeld was not.324 As Forbes, 
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echoing Clausewitz,325 remarks, “a military plan cannot be viewed in isolation 
and the military cannot be the key actor in an intervention strategy.”326  
By using forces that were too lean, the insurgency was permitted to 
survive and finally to thrive. Insurgents such as ISIS had the time to learn and 
export their knowledge to others. Leaner coordinated forces are good for the 
fight, but not for the stabilization. If the annihilation of the Iraqi army was a matter 
of technology, this same technology could not replace the “boots on the ground” 
when the fight went toward a principle of attrition to suffocate an insurgency. 
According to Clausewitz, combat is the means to subdue the adversary. But he 
also pointed out that it is not only the destruction of the physical force that is 
important, but the morale force should also be considered. The insurgency 
frustrated the Alliance’s intentions more on the morale component than the 
purely physical. 
E. INSURGENCY: A PIVOT BETWEEN ESCALATION AND DE-
ESCALATION  
In 2009, Professors Christopher Daase and Sebastian Schindler in 
“Clausewitz, Guerillakrieg und Terrorismus. Zur Aktualitat einer missvertandenen 
Kriegstheorie” remarked that Clausewitz, through his studies on war, not only 
worked on guerilla warfare (Kleinen Krieg) but also remarked that the boundary 
between war and warfare was blurred.327 
What started as inter-state war in Iraq was on the way to a resolution until 
a guerilla warfare broke out in the form of insurgency. Guerilla warfare is a pivot 
between two realms of war (Figure 11). On one side, it expands toward war; on 
the other side, it deflates toward terrorism and civil disobedience and finally 
toward peace. 
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 Continuum of Violence Figure 11. 
 
Adapted from Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael W. 
Johnson, “Clausewitz on Kosovo: A Monograph” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
2000). 
The level of violence was, proportionally to an inter-state war, diminishing 
but also shifting from the armed forces realm to the civilian realm at the end of 
Phase III. However, two major factors did not help to stabilize the situation. First 
was the absence of a concrete plan, akin Operation Eclipse328 in WWII, to 
handle security and a return to normality at the end of the Phase III, which was 
detrimental to the effort of the Coalition’s armed forces. By the time adjustments 
were done, Iraq went from insurgency to a civil war, where the fault lines were 
tribal and religious. Second, the way to respond to war versus guerilla warfare 
differ, not only on operational and strategic levels, with their implications on 
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politics and policies, but also in the way armed forces handle the situation on a 
tactical level. 
A combat unit that trains for months to storm a house in a combat situation 
will not handle a house search like a SWAT team or a police officer. The level of 
violence which may be used by such a combat unit can be exploited as 
propaganda by the guerillas. Werner Hahlweg remarks that, 
In this context, he [Clausewitz] also speaks of the possibilities and 
limitations of terror, arguing that, if one believes ‘the enemy would, 
through the inhuman treatment of the captive insurgents with the 
death penalty, etc,’ demoralize the rebels, we must consider 
‘repaying atrocity with atrocity, violence with violence! It will be a 
simple matter for us to outdo the enemy and lead him back into the 
boundaries of self-control and humanity.’329 
In other words, the game is to downplay physical and morale violence as 
soon as possible to avoid it being used by the insurgency as a way to recruit new 
members. Strachan points out that “in American eyes the principle of restraint is 
now so embedded in some European armies as at time to undermine their 
military value”330; however, restraint may be the solution. Clausewitz explained 
the spiral of violence which is the fuel for the guerilla. Iraq and Afghanistan 
proved him right. Incidents like Abu Ghraib and Haditha only reinforced the 
guerillas. Proportionality and restraint in the use of force is one of the key. 
However, this supposes that two kinds of military units may work in close 
relations. 
An insurgency war needs two types of units within the armed forces to be 
won—(1) the pure combat unit type, in which the main aim is fighting and which 
is able to secure a perimeter around an urban area once the main combat 
operation is ended, and (2) combat units which also act as a reserve to a second 
type of unit, closer in spirit to a SWAT team in their training and responses. This 
second type of unit will clean up the urban area of the rest of the bad elements, 
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acting as a police unit in uniform and in spirit. They have to be flexible and 
trained as police and SWAT more than basic infantry and must act in addition to 
military police. This second type of units will, in time, turn the responsibility of the 
security of the urban area to police forces when the level of violence reaches the 
next pivotal level, that of civil disobedience, and will act as a reserve to police 
forces. However, these should not be combat units tasked with a new mission, 
but rather, distinct troops that did not participate in the original fighting. 
In short, two strategic errors could have been avoided in Iraq. In his time, 
Clausewitz already showed how a nation-state losing a war may use guerrilla 
warfare against an invader and how these guerillas would act and respond to 
violence. According to Kaplan, Rumsfeld was guilty of this first error because he 
simply did not believe in the possibility of an insurgency and so did not order the 
number of troops he was advised to be put on the ground. The second error 
derives from the policy on the use of force; firepower is not always the answer if 
one wants to minimize the spiral of violence. 
F. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE IN 
STRATEGY 
The Iraqi war started as an offensive war which “requires above all a 
quick, irresistible decision.”331 This decision was realized by the application of 
Shock and Awe and followed Clausewitz advice against a systematic occupation 
of useless provinces and followed the “nature of offensive war.” In Book VI, 
Chapter Three, Clausewitz argues that strategic success is directly linked to the 
capacity of one to exploit tactical victories to shatter the opponent’s system. He 
then lists six main factors for strategic effectiveness: the advantage of terrain, 
surprise, concentric attack, strengthening the theater, popular support, and 
exploitation of the morale factor.332 If the three first factors were easily achieved 
by the U.S. Armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the same cannot be said of the 
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three remaining. Noteworthy is that the three firsts factors correspond to Phase 
III, while the three lasts fit in the Phase IV. 
Clausewitz analyses the factors in terms of the nineteenth century; 
however, a parallel can be made to the cases examined here. Concerning the 
fourth factor, strengthening of the theater, the invader is weakened by the fact 
that he leaves his well-known ground to a newer one. It is now the defender who 
knows the fields’ strengths and weakness and can use it against the invader. In 
the case of Iraq, weapons caches, knowledge of the local dynamics, and the lack 
of sensitivity to cultural differences are a few examples which reinforced the 
defending side.  
The fifth factor, the support of the population, encompasses “the 
effectiveness of the militia, and arming the population. Furthermore, every kind of 
friction is reduced, and every source of supply is nearer and more abundant [for 
the defender].”333 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, this aspect was an important 
overlooked factor. Both populations were armed, and both the Afghans and Iraqis 
were effective in the past, against the Russian for the Afghans and Saddam 
Hussein, respectively. In both cases, the “defending” side, al Qaeda or militias, 
were able to use the local population as logistics bases. Moreover, the 
disbandment of the Iraqi Army by ambassador Bremer just gave more trained 
members and equipment to the local militias. Even if in hindsight it appears that 
there was no real Iraqi defensive plan to use militias in “stay behind” scenarios, 
the Pentagon should have planned for a resistance because the probability of its 
occurrence was itself a risk—as Clausewitz warned, “When a strategic attack is 
being planned one should from the start give a very close attention to this point—
namely the defensive that will follow.”334 In the case of Iraq, the most overlooked 
element was the aftermath of the invasion. In the first phase, the coalition was up 
against one defender, Saddam Hussein, supported by a few members of his 
tribe. When his regime fell, new defenders arose and competed for power and 
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security for their own tribes. Thus, by ignoring the aftermath of Phase III, the 
coalition did not recognize the possibility of guerilla warfare sparking along the 
religious fault lines already cracking, but that had been kept together by Saddam 
Hussein’s iron fist. 
Concerning the sixth factor, the morale factors, these are present on both 
sides. The coalition’s armies are generally good at taking care of their own 
morale factors. However, the lack of understanding of the dynamics of media and 
in knowing how to interact with it, and with social media in particular, proved to 
be detrimental over time, especially when coupled with the perceived lack of 
added security in Iraq and Afghanistan. This may be correlated with the 
difference in connectivity of both countries. Time is a morale factor which is at the 
beginning of campaign always overlooked, like the “we will be home for 
Christmas…” for WWI. If “war serves the purpose of the defense more than of 
the aggressor,”335 this is also true for the guerilla warfare which “defends” its own 
field, and it was best described by the first slide from the “council of colonels” 
brief to General Peter Pace: “We are losing because we are not winning. And we 
are running out of time.”336 The fact that the invader is running out of time is an 
advantage for the guerilla warfare, which wins by not losing. With respect to the 
number of guerilla conflicts in which America has intervened openly or covertly 
around the world in the past century, it is still puzzling that, despite warnings, the 
decision-makers at the political level did not admit the possibility of a long, 
protracted conflict in either Afghanistan or Iraq.  
With the passing of time, war affects the political realm and forces it to 
change its policies because of widespread discontent or other pressure from the 
people. This was true for Vietnam and will be true also for the future wars. Long 
wars are not suited for democratic countries, as General Marshall warned: “A 
democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.”337 Thus, the scope of war should 
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be limited, with achievable goals for the armed forces. The core of the problem 
resides in the strategic views of the decision-making actors. Colonel Gentile 
stated, 
Our senior leaders could have discerned early the folly of trying to 
build Afghanistan into a modern state overnight and would have 
deduced that the core policy goal of destroying al Qaeda could 
have been done by a much smaller force concentrated against the 
few remaining al Qaeda left after the Taliban had been removed in 
early 2002. Unfortunately, Americans strategy has failed in 
Afghanistan (and Iraq) because it was founded on an illusion – that 
American style counterinsurgency could win Muslim hearts and 
minds at gun-point and create viable nation-states on the Western 
model virtually from scratch in a short time.338 
With this statement, Gentile was making a point that the goals of the wars 
were blurred and thus no coherent strategy could eventuate in the face of the 
dual problems of resistance in the two nations. The aim was to destroy the al 
Qaeda terror network, but over time, it transformed itself into a mission of nation-
building in Afghanistan, and a regime change from a tyrannical regime to a 
democratic state, also implying a goal of nation-building activities, with an 
approach based on a Western ideology and way of life, which is not the cultural 
background of the targeted countries.  
Despite all claims to the contrary, the Global War on Terror is not a 
strategy, and not even a policy. Clausewitz warns not to go to war without 
knowing the goal of the war, knowing how to conduct the war, and knowing the 
political purpose and its operational objectives.339 The United States’ choice to 
include Iraq in the Global War on Terror was an error for numerous reasons. 
First, an action against terrorism cannot be waged on a global scale with the 
same forces and rules around the globe; strategy and operations have to be 
tailored to fit the local conditions, and Afghanistan is not Iraq. Second, the name 
itself—Global War on Terror—is targeting a way of fighting and not an actual 
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actor; there is almost no possibility for defining measurable, achievable goals for 
the armed forces. However, if the armed forces fought a war against al Qaeda, 
the goal would be clearer and could be measured. Third, the Global War on 
Terror is bound up with Western ideology. No short war can be fought against an 
ideology. The Cold War was an ideological war, but it was fought and won based 
on such tangible assets as economy, and it took decades to win it. Ideology was 
the background, not the medium, used to fight a confusing conflict that always 
threatened to end in total catastrophe.  
Fourth, the Afghanistan operation started as separate from Iraq in all 
possible relations. Al Qaeda was in the aftermath of September 11, a legitimate 
target and recognized as such by the vast majority of the world; Iraq was not. 
Colin Powell, then U.S. secretary of state, tried hard to sell the risk of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as a just cause. If the WMDs were such a 
worry for America, why did the CIA have so “little concrete information”340 on the 
946 sites? By trying to hit multiple targets with the same war, it not only used 
more resources, but it confused the overall U.S. strategy. From the destruction of 
the Taliban and al Qaeda to a regime change in Iraq and nation-building in two 
countries, there was no possibility of bringing it all under the same Global War on 
Terror from the start. In the case of Afghanistan, it was viewed as police action 
against terrorists, which was the actual goal. No one was expecting an “absolute 
form of war,” with the only option being a “final victory.”341 In Iraq, the build-up 
and the expectation of the U.S. military-political decision-maker was closer to the 
absolute form of war. In the end, the result was that the final victory never 
materialized. The media and the population at home was waiting for it and did not 
understand, nor did anyone explain, that the two types of war that America was 
in, were a lesser form of war, a limited war, in which “all that counts is the total 
score, and each separate result makes its contribution toward this total.”342 In 
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other words, Afghanistan and Iraq should have been fought under separate 
“wars” and never have been linked in any form; the “global” is partially 
responsible for the unwanted outcomes.  
In Afghanistan, the goal was to remove the Taliban and al Qaeda. This 
could have been done without nation-building. In Iraq, the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein was only one battle, not the end of the war. As a regime change was 
announced, the obvious end of the war would have been a peace agreement 
with a new regime operating in a safe and secure environment. Simpson 
deduced “if force is to have political utility, one needs to understand the nature of 
the problem on its own terms, not through dogmatically applied ideological or 
doctrinal lenses.”343 The problem with the Global War on Terror was the 
generalization of the aim which “fails to understand one’s environment in its own 
political terms, [thus] one does not know what political effect one will have.”344 
This discrepancy will eventually be corrected on the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism in June 2011: “The United States deliberately uses the word 
‘war’ to describe our relentless campaign against al-Qa’ida. However, this 
Administration has made it clear that we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism 
or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa’ida.”345 
However, the resulting series of half measures in between was a butchered 
political result of both conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The misconception 
reflected by the highest level of the politic decision-making at the beginning of 
these two conflicts, and more specifically in Iraq, on which kind of war they were 
on the verge of entering was important until the “surge,” as Kaplan pointed out: 
“the American authorities still seemed in denial over the nature and scope of the 
problem.”346  
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In both cases, the nation-building piece of the campaign came after the 
start of military operations. Nation-building is a long process, which may span 
over generations, difficult enough in more peaceful conditions like in Kosovo or 
Bosnia, in which Europe, along with the United States, had been active since the 
end of the last century. Moreover, the Balkans were proportionally more 
advanced than Afghanistan and almost similar in development to Iraq. There was 
no reason to suppose it would go faster with the two latter countries, especially 
as they were not embracing Western mindsets or values, which were present in 
the Balkans to start with.  
War is won when the enemy is defeated. In the cases of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the following assertion should be made: war is won when the enemies are 
defeated; and Clausewitz would have added, “but what exactly does ‘defeat’ 
signify?”347 There is a discrepancy between Clausewitz’s interpretation of the 
defeat and Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime or Afghanistan. Clausewitz 
offers three general possibilities to defeat the enemy: destruction of the army, 
seizure of the capital, or the delivery of an effective blow against his principal 
ally.348 In the case of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and for the militias in Iraq, 
Clausewitz’s three possibilities to defeat an enemy would have to be summarized 
as follows: destruction of its forces, seizure of its bases, and destruction of its 
allies. This is also true if there is more than one enemy. Gentile reported that the 
fight against al Qaeda in Afghanistan was problematic because al Qaeda did not 
operate with constancy. Clausewitz argues that the more the enemies are in an 
alliance instead of acting as independent actors, the more they can be regarded 
as one opponent.349 This is what was done in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. 
They were regarded as one opponent until late in the conflicts because it was 
assumed they had an alliance, in the way Western armed forces understood 
alliances. In reality, it was a loose aggregation of “armed groups” with caveats, 
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not an alliance.350 Thus, in the words of Clausewitz, when centers of gravity 
cannot be fused in one, one should “act as if there were two wars or even more, 
each with its own object.”351 Not only does this view require “adequate” forces, 
but “we must be certain our political position is so secure that this success will 
not bring further enemies against us who could force us immediately to abandon 
our efforts against our first opponent.”352  
What Clausewitz did not have during his life is global connectivity. 
Because of connectivity, Simpson postulates that “war today is in the process of 
undergoing another evolution in response to social and political conditions, 
namely the speed and interconnectivity associated with contemporary 
globalization and the information revolution.”353 Unlike van Creveld, Simpson 
stresses an evolution, which concurs with Clausewitz’s views on the use of 
technologies by armies,354 to which one has to adapt, not a revolution in warfare. 
One may disagree with Simpson’s suggestion that war itself is undergoing 
the transformation process, but leaders in charge of the conduct of the war have 
to understand how to use those news tools efficiently toward populations which 
are not from the same culture and do not aspire to the same “way of life,” to 
support combat operations adequately. Simpson demonstrates that connectivity 
and the use of narratives are powerful if well used. Democratic states are weaker 
in the use of narrative than groups such has al Qaeda and its affiliates, mainly 
because of legal self-imposed constraints, in Clausewitz’s view.355  
Connectivity permits the broadcasting of another narrative of what is going 
on on the ground and appeals to other fragments of societies farther away from 
the battlefield: “Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right 
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to win the hearts [and] minds.”356 The cultural and political misunderstanding of 
Western states toward the East has proven to be detrimental in the short term. 
The rise of groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and its 
further denominations have proved Simpson right in his analysis, if, as Simpson 
says, in a Clausewitzian world, “the core strategic audiences of the conflict are to 
be found within the side themselves.”357 One shall not forget that with 
connectivity, other audiences outside the two or more camps are yet relevant. 
This extension of the original core audiences’ appeal for another message is 
directed to the new fringes to convince them of the goals of the war. 
In Afghanistan, for instance, one of the problems was that the Western 
nations referred to it as a unitary land with a central government. However, every 
province in Afghanistan should have been treated as a country because of its 
tribal fractioning, in which the central government is the tribe leader. In such an 
approach, Clausewitz is relevant. In Clausewitz’s view, one can only fail if 
Afghanistan is considered as a single unified country because it is not what it is 
in reality at the time; the central government was not recognized by all provinces. 
This highly dynamic environment for decision-making necessitates a high 
coordination of all assets until a central government is recognized.358 
Such an environment demands adequate counterinsurgency tactics, 
tailored for the specific environment. “The requirement of strategic narrative to 
bind its audience is crucial,”359 as Simpson says, but there is a double-edged 
sword. First, the education of the masses sharpened the narrative as everyone 
interpreted the message with his own bias. Second, coupled with the availability 
of information (globalization), the narrative has to be free of lies to be persuasive. 
If two totally different narratives are found, educated masses will start to doubt 
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what is said. This is the danger of the digitized world. Narratives must be 
synchronized with what may be seen, read, or watched on film. 
People in Iraq or Afghanistan may want both peace and more liberty. 
However, as General Pete W. Chiarelli asked, “What if they just don’t want what 
we want?”360 Not only may they not want it our way, but as Gentile remarks, the 
overall structure of their society may not be ready for a change “after ten years of 
nation building, something resembling democracy in the Hindu Kush will take 
generations and generations to create.”361 Thus, keeping the political and military 
aims of the war limited at the start may help to avoid long conflicts that 
democracies cannot win because the population’s discontent overtime will only 
reinforce, directly or indirectly, the guerrilla side.  
Clausewitz sees the use of guerilla warfare at the periphery of the main 
battle: “The operations of the guerrilla units, whether militia or bands of 
inhabitants, should always take place just outside the theater of war where the 
enemy forces do not appear in strength, on the ‘edges.’”362 In other words, 
guerilla is a part of a “larger scale” war; however, it may not be seen as such as 
recent cases plainly suggest. The question, specifically in the case of Iraq, is, 
where is the real war, that is, the center of gravity; did Iraq became a proxy war 
when the Saddam Hussein regime fell?  
In his Book Six, Chapter Six, Clausewitz explains the relationship between 
the militias and the concept of defense and also stresses the “defender’s allies” 
as “his ultimate source of support.”363 Moreover, an ally is not to be understood 
as a direct ally, but one “who [has] a substantial interest in maintaining the 
integrity of their ally’s country.”364 The coalition forces did not recognize early 
enough the rise of the sectarian violence in Iraq after the fall of the regime and 
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misinterpreted it as a resistance against the coalition and its effort of “liberating 
Iraq.” What could have happened was the emergence of a proxy war between 
Iran and the United States through militias. The Iranians’ end goals may not have 
been to directly support religious sectarian conflict, but by fueling it and by 
staying outside, it certainly helped to show Iran as a regional power and put 
pressure on the United States to solve Iranian interest outside the sectarian 
realm.  
From past experience, it was foreseeable that the coalition would enter 
Iraq and push the Iraqi army within the borders of its country. Hannah Arendt 
also demonstrates in On Violence, that “if a foreign conqueror is confronted by an 
impotent government and by a nation unused to the exercise of political power, it 
is easy for him to achieve such domination.”365 Saddam Hussein’s regime, being 
a unique ruling party system, did not prepare the state apparatus to take over 
and be independent of its leader. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime followed 
by the de-Ba’athification of the state apparatus resulted in the destruction of the 
state’s power and nobody in power outside the party was able to step in and take 
responsibility for Iraq in a coherent effort from the start. Iraq did not have the 
same history of liberalism as Germany had prior to the 1940s; the de-Nazification 
was possible because Germany’s recent past allowed it. For the sectarian 
leaders in Iraq, the aim of their war was to gain power to assert themselves, and 
in some respect, to protect their communities from others. Their aim fulfilled 
Maslow’s Pyramid of Needs, especially when the strong central power had 
vanished and the occupation powers were not able to provide basic security to 
all. Arendt argues that “where power has disintegrated, revolutions are possible, 
but not necessary.”366  
In the Iraqi case, the militias did not pursue revolution; they wanted to 
reassert power. Arendt also recognizes that “power is indeed of the essence of 
all government, but violence is not,” for no government can survive based on 
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violence only.367 By the beginning of the invasion, the lack of a good strategy 
regarding the stabilization phase368 allowed violence to take over the state’s 
residual power and permitted its destruction; this became especially true when 
Presidential Envoy Bremer unilaterally disbanded the Iraqi army, the last 
available resort to implement some degree of security in the country by a local 
authority.  
Tactical victories can be achieved with violence, but without power, no 
strategic peace can be reached, because every side will pay a high price to 
achieve fewer stable results and, according to Arendt, power never grows out of 
violence.369 When power is eroded by violence, the last remaining possibility to 
maintain domination is terror as a “form of government that comes into being 
when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate, but on the 
contrary, remains in full control. … Every kind of organized opposition must 
disappear before the full force of terror can be let loose.”370 The lack of a plan for 
stabilization, the premature de-Ba’athification of Iraq and the disbandment of the 
Iraqi army permitted the erosion of power, which authorized the apparition of 
sectarian violence, which in turn opened the gates to terrorism. Kaplan explains it 
well: 
The problem was that in some cases … the insurgency was the 
population or an important segment of it. If, as the manual stated, a 
purely military solution isn’t possible, if these kinds of wars usually 
end with a political negotiation, this poses a problem.371  
When the insurgency started, the coalition forces were an enemy to any 
sectarian factions because they stood between targets and reduced the liberty of 
action of the factions to go at each other’s throats to assert power over the other. 
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In such a situation, the factions had to rely on some form of resistance to survive 
and on guerilla warfare to regain some degree of liberty of action. 
In Book Six, Chapter Eight, Clausewitz analyzes four types of resistance. 
In all cases, the defender has the advantage. Logically, when the defender is 
outnumbered, the logic is to “withdraw to the interior of the country and resist 
there … the simplest and most outstanding example would be the case in which 
the defender is able to leave one or more fortresses behind, which the attacker 
must invest or besiege.”372 In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the fourth case is 
more interesting to analyze because it is the one which is “particularly effective in 
weakening the enemy.”373 Clausewitz explains the use of fortresses to weaken 
the adversary. Of course, there are no more fortresses today; however, the 
parallel with cities like Basra, Tikrit, or Mosul may be explored. Kilcullen also 
refers to “garrison community” to “describe the informal system of security and 
order that have emerged in marginalized urban settlements,”374 similar in many 
ways to the old concept of a military garrison in charge of a sector. It may not 
have been a fortress in the common view but it played the same role, a focal 
point with “two distinct elements, one active and one passive.”375 The active part 
is the defender or rebels, and the passive part being the protection through 
anonymity that the city by its size, gives the rebels.  
This combination draws a huge amount of forces to stabilize or “seize” 
such a “fortress” and therefore weakens the situation of the coalition in the rest of 
the country; the result was “obvious that it will weaken his [the invader’s] forces 
and provide an opportunity for the attack by the defender at a point where he has 
the upper hand.”376 First, the city draws forces to secure; second, once inside, 
the invader’s freedom of movement is reduced; and third, he is more exposed 
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than before to the defender,377 making this a perfect “focal point of a general 
insurrection.”378 Today’s cities are yesterday’s fortresses; urbanization is one of 
the four factors which will challenge armed forces in David Kilcullen’s views of 
the future of warfare in his last book, Out of the Mountains.379  
Fighting in such situations will also cost the guerrilla side—with time, it will 
be weakened; the remaining question is, who will be weakened first? The time 
factor elapses in a relative and different way for each side. For the invader, as 
losses grow and the effort seems to be ineffective at first, his morale may 
decline. The defender side is betting on lower losses at first and gaining morale 
support from the inhabitants to replenish his forces with time. Time is on the side 
of guerillas because they only have to make sure not to be defeated to win. As 
Clausewitz argues, when the defender cannot defend the country anymore and 
retreats, his aim will change from protection of the country to a “favorable 
peace.”380 This is what happened in Iraq after the fall of the regime during the 
“Anbar Awaking.” For some militias, a favorable peace was possible; 
concessions were made by the militias as well as by the coalition, giving credit to 
Gentile’s observations that “sometimes, in a war that involves limited policy aims, 
there may well be alternative to [total] victory.”381 The problem was more due to 
prior bold statements draped in Western ideology made by political decision-
makers at a strategic level which impaired possible agreements at the 
operational or tactical levels. 
Resistance, as Clausewitz points out, by its nature will not permit a major 
counteroffensive from the invader. Clausewitz complains that previous 
commanders did not report enough of their experiences on this not-very-common 
way of war and therefore an in-depth analysis is not possible. However, he sees 
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two options at a strategic level: once one has lost the war, the choices are to try 
to come to a better peace agreement or to help in the main battle,382 such as the 
French Resistance in support of D-Day in 1944. Resistance may have different 
outcomes and Clausewitz did not foresee effective resistance on a larger scale 
as being possible outside of Russia, because of the need for space to be 
efficient.383 However, resistance in diverse conflicts have proven to be possible 
in smaller areas than Russia; Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be large enough.  
Clausewitz makes an interesting point in his Book Six, Chapter Twenty-
Six, lising five criteria that favor the resistance movement. They are summarized 
in Table 2 and compared with other theaters of war. These four countries differ in 
sizes and climate but were all successful in some way in their resistances.  
Table 2.   Clausewitz’s Conditions for Effectiveness of a General 
Uprising 
Clausewitz’s conditions for 
effectiveness of a general uprising Kosovo Vietnam Afghanistan Iraq 
1. The war must be fought in the 
interior of the country. Y Y Y Y 
2. It must not be decided by a 
single stroke of the enemy. Y Y Y Y 
3. The theater of operations must 
constitute a “considerable region.” N Y Y Y 
4. The national character must be 





Y Y Tribal 
Y 
Tribal 
5. The terrain must be rough and 
inaccessible because of 
mountains, forests, swamps, or 
“the local methods of cultivation.” 
Y Y Y Y 
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Clausewitz’s description on how militias and rebels have to be used in 
order to be efficient is well known and proved to be efficient in all the four 
countries in the table. However, if Clausewitz foresaw such usage of militias at a 
country level, it did not encompass the atomization of such militias as seen with 
Iraq or Afghanistan. Nonetheless, if one can find the trinity of those militias, 
Clausewitz’s principles still applies. As efficient as it can be, such insurgencies 
can also be defeated;384 this was the effort of the proponents of COIN more or 
less after the year 2005.  
As Porch remarks, “campaigns of counterinsurgency conducted by 
outsiders often fail because they create legitimacy gaps that are exploited by 
insurgents.”385 This gap is often to be found in the political realm, expressed first 
in their incapacity to deliver security and justice. Clausewitz explains why such 
insurgency was not possible under the reign of Saddam Hussein: “National 
uprising cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger.”386 
The way out may rest on an understanding of the “trinity.” According to Gordon, 
the U.S. political-military level did not understand “the actual structure of political 
power in Iraq,”387 neither the kind of enemy fought once the regime fell, which 
was a decentralized one.388  
This reinforces the analysis of Captain Brett Friedmann in his article 
“Creeping Death,”389 published in February 2014 in the Military Review. 
Friedmann argues that COIN specialists have ignored Clausewitz’s trinity leading 
to a known result. His analysis argues for a COIN approach along the trinity and 
neither “population-centric” or “enemy-centric”: “The trinity’s nodes must be 
seized and the insurgents’ system flooded. Insurgencies die through 
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suffocation.”390 Thus, Friedmann not only links counterinsurgency to a national-
level mission and not just a purely military one, but also integrates John Boyd in 
the effort. Friedmann’s idea is to outrun the adversary OODA loops base on the 
adversary’s inability to keep his own trinity untouched. 
The classical Clausewitz expert, Hahlweg, remarks that “guerrilla war can 
only be understood in the larger political-strategic context. As part of a general 
strategy, it will fully develop its potential strength;”391 hence, the solution as to be 
political-strategic first and military second. As Simpson remarks, “an operational 
approach must connect back to its political purpose, or risk that self-referencing 
military logic drive a war much further than political utility,”392 which echoes 
Clausewitz in his Book Eight: “whenever this occurs … the many links that 
connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless 
and devoid of sense.”393 If Clausewitz, and history, make it clear that in every 
war, policies play a role, the primacy of the political realm over the military realm 
is established.  
However, in the recent past, with Iraq and Afghanistan, the political realm 
misunderstood Clausewitz, as did the military realm, by claiming that only Jomini 
was right. Clausewitz claims that policy rules over the military; the use of force is 
a political act to achieve a political aim. “If war is part of policy, policy will 
determine its character.”394 But the political realm’s prerogative stops there: 
“Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details … but they 
are the most influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of 
the battle.”395 The micromanagement under Rumsfeld went against this concept, 
and needless to say against Jomini’s views. 
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What is policy? “The aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of 
internal administration as well as of spiritual values. … we can only treat policy 
as representative of all interests of the community.”396 Policy is thus the base of 
the national strategy on which war plans are established subordinating the 
military realm to the political. It also entails the coordination factor in regards to 
the DIME realms. If “war is simply a continuation of the political intercourse, with 
the addition of other means,”397 then strategy is a two-way bridge, as described 
by Simpson, Strachan, Gentile, and confirmed by General Zinni.398  
Clausewitz’s deductions focused on war between states; however, these 
tenets are still true if during the analysis of a conflict (e.g., Afghanistan), planners 
take the time to admit that in absence of a central government, they have to treat 
each provincial government as the counterpart to whom the military campaign is 
aimed at. Such admission leads to a complex, dynamic military environment, 
which cannot by itself resolve all problems without a continuous link with the 
national strategy. This link, as Simpson said, is a two-way bridge. In a dynamic 
information society, it requires a constant dialogue between the operational level 
and the national strategy level. The dynamic is such in the globalized world that 
delay may impair sound judgments and plead for a political decision-making 
representative on the side of the operational level in the theater, or at least that 
the guidance given allows enough latitude to the military decision-making to 
reach, when needed, the immediate decision in the frame given by its political 
leaders.  
In such fragmented societies, a Manichean view of the world is seldom 
possible or useful. Another consideration is that Clausewitz’s realm is war, and 
thus does not apply to nation-building, in which Machiavelli may be more 
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relevant, as he wrote Prince, extensively studied by Clausewitz,399 during a 
troubled time of fragmented societies. Western states have to avoid such 
declarations in black or white terms and focus on goals which can be seen in 
shades of gray, at least during the nation-building phase. There are some values 
which are non-negotiable; however, Western states have to also be realistic and 
accept a step-by-step negotiating process rather than an all-or-nothing 
negotiation. 
In non-state conflicts, the first important step is to build trust to go forward. 
However, sometimes the ally of yesterday is today’s enemy, and may be 
tomorrow’s friend. In order to not alienate these possibilities, small steps are 
needed in the same way that time is needed. Time plays a central role in war. 
The tempo has to be on the invader’s side if he wants to prevail. But when 
combat operations are ended, if the real strategic-political goal is stability, nation-
building has to be part of the overall plan. Nation-building by its essence is a long 
and costly process, as shown throughout history in Germany, Japan, Korea, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and other places. History equally shows that the more 
fragmented a country is in its society (ethnicity, religion, etc.), the longer the 
investment of time to reach state-wide stability. If Western states are not ready to 
commit to a multi-generation-long investment, the political-strategic goal should 
be clearly defined as ending with the conclusion of the combat operation and with 
the withdrawal.  
This is why, militarily, the first Persian Gulf was a success and not the 
second; the first time there was no nation-building. However, for nation-building 
to work, trust and security must be the precondition to a political settlement.400 
Situations from Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that if security was a 
problem, establishing trust was a greater problem. History had a role, as 
demonstrated by the British in Basora, but also the lack of coordination at the 
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national level between the DIME realm and military actions at the operational 
level, which had repercussions at the tactical level. This dichotomy created a 
cycle of mistrust which fueled the insurgency. 
This cycle started by an absence of a clear top-down coordinated strategy, 
not only in the DIME realm, but also interagency-wise. In the absence of strategy, 
units try to solve problems as they can by isolated actions. When those actions 
reach the higher level, they are discarded (for various reasons, such as a group 
helping at the tactical level is not supporting women’s rights, for example). As a 
result, higher levels undo previous promises from the tactical units, fueling the 
narrative of the insurgency along the lines of “you see, they do not hold their 
words; we cannot trust them.” Depending on the tactical costs, this produces new 
recruits for insurgency or at least a higher level of mistrust between the 
population and the coalition. As tactical units rotate frequently, the locals may not 
forget the previous reality or perceived betrayal of the departing unit. The new 
units do not understand why its “strategy” does not work and try to change the 
approach, resulting in a strategy that is even less coordinated with the upper 
level.401 This is one example of misunderstanding due to a lack in policy.402  
As a result, “policy could make demands on war which war could not 
fulfill.”403 Clausewitz concludes that “at the highest level the art of war turns into 
policy”404 and disregards a “purely military”405 option at this level as much as he 
discards the idea that a general should give “purely military advice”406 to its 
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government. This is the two-way bridge that was missing in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
according to General Zinni,407 Kaplan, Strachan, Simpson, and Gentile.  
In this demonstration, Clausewitz does not preach for an apolitical 
priesthood of the military person. The use of the army is subordinate to the 
politic; the generals have to explain the political consequences of military actions; 
the army fights to reach military objectives with political significances; but the 
soldier, as a citizen, can vote as he wants. Now, every soldier applies this as he 
himself sees fit. Eisenhower, MacArthur, or Pershing had different approaches.  
For John Nagl, “counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is 
the graduate level of war,”408 and Etienne de Durand posits that “[Colonel] 
Lacheroy begins with the misunderstood originality and effectiveness of 
revolutionary warfare, which is not small war or guerilla warfare under another 
name, but the truest and most accomplished form of total war.”409 Haleweg, on 
his side, is persuaded that 
an investigation of the nature, function, possibilities, and limitations 
of guerrilla warfare either in history or in the present day—cannot 
ignore Clausewitz. His work On War may contribute to the further 
development of a modern, comprehensive, and philosophically-
founded theory of guerrilla warfare.410  
Guerilla or insurgency is distinct from pure terrorism by its need to use 
offense and defense in a limited manner to be efficient over time. Terrorism is 
only hit and run. Defense is only to avoid capture. Insurgency needs, on one 
hand, territories to survive and grow; thus, they need to defend their territories. 
But on the other hand, the insurgents need to pressure their adversary to divert 
its efforts over other, less important, territories to attack their adversary and show 
its weakness. In this respect insurgent follow a limited aims in offense and 
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defense. In an offensive war, insurgents seek the occupation of part of the 
territory to gain resources. This is a viable option for guerillas. It gives more 
leverage for negotiations and diverts adversary assets from their main task in 
order to resize those territories.411 In the limited aim for a defensive war, “If we 
considered the relative exhaustion of forces on both sides, the defender is at a 
disadvantage.”412 If the guerilla fighter cannot significantly weaken the attacker 
rapidly, overtime, the guerilla weakens quicker. However, Clausewitz remarks 
that “the fatigue of the stronger has often brought about peace.”413 This is based 
on the factor of time. The guerilla fighter has to use time to defeat Goliath and bet 
on change in the political climate; as Clausewitz suggests, either the guerilla 
fighters gain new allies or his enemy’s allies start to desert, tipping the balance of 
power in the other direction. In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, both options 
applied.  
G. A WAR PLAN DESIGNED FOR THE TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY 
Clausewitz points out two principles to achieve such a plan: concentration 
and speed. This requires defining the center of gravity which has to be 
destroyed. In physics, there is only one center of gravity for a physical object. 
The wording “center of gravity” led to a misunderstanding in the planning. In the 
original manuscript, Clausewitz refers to Schwerpunkt, which translates better to 
“point of effort” or “focal point.” One can argue back and forth on the accuracy of 
the translation, but one has to recognize that today a state’s complex system 
does not offer a single point to attack in order to paralyze the whole state. This is 
the whole raison d’être of redundancy of systems of control and command in a 
state. Thus, the relationship to the physical description can be misleading. With 
this translation, one allows multiple “point of efforts” to be attacked in the 
complex systems of today. In the normal PMESII analysis of a state, every 
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system has different nodes, which once destroyed, paralyze a part of the system, 
and finally it’s whole. Even when overlapping, complex systems do not give only 
one single center of gravity.  
The killing of Osama bin Laden has proven that bin Laden was not the 
center of gravity for al Qaeda; al Qaeda did not collapse, but bin Laden was 
certainly one of the nodes, which necessitated a specific effort to be made. 
Clausewitz tries to diminish the number of those “Schwerpunkt” to a single one; 
however, he recognize that due to some parameters described in Book Eight, 
Chapter Nine, it is not always feasible. The closer to the combat, the easier it is 
to find only one center of gravity; but at a strategic level, a state has multiple 
centers of gravity. This is also true if the enemy is not a single entity. It is easier 
to define the center of gravity of the U.S. Army as being its logistical dependency 
than to define a single center of gravity for the Global War on Terror; but even 
there, what installation should be whipped out to stop cold the U.S. armed forces 
at once? Clausewitz’s center of gravity must be seen as a neuralgic point in the 
subsystem of the state. However, Clausewitz said “we hold, moreover, that the 
plan of operations should have this tendency even when the enemy’s whole 
resistance cannot be reduced to a single center of gravity and when, as we have 
once put it, two almost wholly separate wars have to be fought 
simultaneously,”414 this tendency being “to keep each minor operation as 
subordinate as possible.”415 This is the unity of command, which must be 
maintained.  
In Iraq, the two simultaneous wars were nothing but Phase III and Phase 
IV. Two types of engagements should have been planned and executed almost 
simultaneously, but under the same higher command. Gray also sees the 
strategic value of that for the coordination of efforts along the state’s actors 
regarding the use of national powers, but he sees it more “theoretical than 
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practical”416 due to the difference of reaction in time of the PMESII. However, in 
order to win, this has to be done practically. Some actions may have to be 
implemented earlier than others to achieve their effects at the right moment to 
support military action. This is strategic planning. 
If in a normal war, one tends to achieve a “concentric attack,” in an 
insurgency or guerilla war, a “divided attack” may be necessary.417 This 
reflection is based on the fact that insurgency, by its nature, tends to not 
concentrate its forces. Divided attack may also be translated today as attacks on 
multiple nodes of the complex system of the insurgency faced. This led to the 
question of the concentration of forces or mass. Colin S. Gray points out that “the 
idea that mass really meant [is] the ‘massing of effect’ not forces;”418 in other 
words, it is to concentrate enough means of the right quality to achieve the 
desired effect at the right time in the right space. This can be a division or just a 
sniper team—the size is not the principal matter. This is also true for the 
insurgency; proportional to their seizure, a team with a bomb is a concentration 
of mass. 
The second principle is speed. “Speed and impetus are its [initial surprise] 
strongest elements and are usually indispensable if we are to defeat the 
enemy.”419 Today, this remains true at an operational level. However, at a 
strategic level, surprise cannot easily be achieved and certainly not with 
operations like in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the sheer amount of means to be 
readied. Al Qaeda achieved a strategic surprise with far fewer means on 
September 11, but they were not surprised by the aftermath. That is to say, 
speed is an operational element, not a strategic one. An assault may be timed, 
not a war.  
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If a state decided to enter a war, it should aim for a long commitment and 
plan accordingly. This implies a broader mobilization to call the reserves and 
start the training for war, with all of its consequences, because as Clausewitz 
remarks:  
Once a major victory is achieved there must be no talk of rest, of 
breathing space, of reviewing the position or consolidating and so 
forth, but only of the pursuit, going for the enemy again if 
necessary, seizing his capital, attacking his reserves and anything 
else that might give his country aid and comfort.420  
An adequate mobilization of comprehensive resources can only be done 
through accurate intelligence work. This intelligence must not only occur on the 
military level because danger can also come from history, religion, and 
neighborhood, to cite a few of the possibilities. Clausewitz remarks that 
to discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war 
we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. 
We must gauge the strength and the situation of the opposing 
state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government 
and people and to do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we 
must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and effect the 
war may have on them.421 
The inadequacy of forces after Phase III and the absence of a plan for 
Phase IV achieved exactly the opposite of a total victory. The major victory was 
not exploited by faulty policitics back in the Pentagon: the momentum was 
exhausted; as Clausewitz said, “every pause between one success and the next 
gives the enemy new opportunity.”422 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1991, Major Herbert T. Holden remarked:  
The theories of Clausewitz are timeless because he did not analyze 
war from the mechanical aspects of how battles were fought 
between opposing generals. Instead, he analyzed warfare from the 
social, political, moral, and emotional perspectives as well as the 
tactical and strategic levels.423  
A manuscript from Gordon R. Sullivan and LTC James M. Dubik in 1993 
makes almost the same analysis.424 More recently, Frank Ledwidge, analyzing 
the failure of the British military in Iraq and Afghanistan, cited Lieutenant General 
H.R. McMaster who emphasizes, with a view to the dead end constituted of the 
1990s revolution in military affairs, that “rapid, highly mobile action has ‘artificially’ 
divorced war from its political, human and psychological dimension. … we were 
behind at [the war’s] outset,’”425 which is a powerful recognition of the importance 
and relevance of Clausewitz’s thoughts today.  
What made Clausewitz well-known, and still reminds us of his work, like a 
“subterranean river through all of modern military thought,”426 is that we 
continually forget that, first, war is not a separate from a country’s policy and 
politics has domestic as well as external facets, but is an integral part of such 
policy; second, that the trinity of reason, chance, and anger as well as hatred is 
still decisive and is the difference between defeat and victory, even more in this 
globalized and digitally connected world; and third, that force is not only armies 
and material, but also morale forces in their subtle power. This neglect of the 
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factor of morale in the skewing of the Schwerpünkte of reason and anger and 
hatred has imposed a fateful weakness on the West since 2001. 
James J. Carafano remarks that, despite a generalized emphasis on 
technology, because senior soldiers relish an overemphasis on the Moltkean 
idea of a clear delineation between civilian and soldier, it is thus “unremarkable 
that modern military theorists made little effort to extend the principles of war 
much beyond the battlefield.”427 This point was that of Clausewitz in On War, to 
think in the sense of the whole and to understand the dynamics of war rather 
than using a checklist that may not work—as was done by Tasker Bliss in the 
wake of the 1918 war. His attempt to draw “lessons” from the American 
experience in the recent war became ineffective because they were not tailored 
to the conflict at hand. Carafano argues for a more holistic approach of the “new 
wars,” and the key lies with Clausewitz. Thomas X. Hammes, in his article “the 
Future of Warfare,”428 also demonstrates a relationship with Clausewitz’s 
approach to war. Dr. Nikolas Gardner of the Air War College, in his article 
“Resurrecting the ‘Icon’” in response to the views of Meilinger on Clausewitz, 
identifies the U.S. Field Manual 3–24 Counterinsurgency as evidence of the 
“impact”429 of Clausewitz in recent military thought and credited especially David 
Kilcullen and John Nagl, who participated in its redaction to be the sources of 
influence, although not the only ones as Generals Huba Wass de Czege and 
Petraeus were also part of the board.  
As concerns the nation-states that are still conducting wars, the trinity of 
chance, political effect, and anger/hatred are still relevant to the strategy and 
faulty choices by certain policymakers and generals of “center of gravity” led to 
mistakes with far-reaching consequences. Now is the time, in the view of this 
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author, to put aside visceral reactions against Clausewitz and to start to study his 
work more closely; this attention has to be focused at the junction of the military 
and the political. Such a study is not done by reading it word for word. The 
answer is not in Jomini. Clausewitz is not a nemesis of Jomini, but an extension 
of the former’s ideas. As Clausewitz said, “The part and the whole must always 
be thought of together.”430 This is the first part of the challenge—to synchronize 
and rebuild the “two-way bridge” of strategy between the political and military 
realms. 
The second part of the challenge is to understand Clausewitz in the 
twenty-first century, to make the “parts” fit in the “whole.” Although not new, 
communication is faster today than in Clausewitz’s era. This fact challenges the 
strategy-makers, because they have less time than their predecessors to make 
sound decisions on time. Even with data collection that is faster than ever before, 
the “fog of war” will not disappear. In the past, the quality of the data was a 
problem. Today the quantity of the data represents a problem because their 
interpretation can lead to multiple solutions. Insofar, decision-makers need to 
strategize from an unbiased context of any war that may lie ahead; the solution 
does not lay in the quantity of data but in how those data are interpreted. 
Moreover, this understanding has to be done in the potential adversary’s 
narrative and culture if planners at the strategic level want to succeed. 
For Clausewitz, it was somewhat easier to understand conflicts in his time 
because there was no unfathomable cultural gap as might be said to operate 
between the think tanks of Washington, DC, and the tribal hives of the Khyber 
Pass. His conflicts were played between monolithic, Christian-rooted countries of 
Europe, although within the same structure. Today, this cultural and religious gap 
between the conflicting parties is wider than ever before and strategic planners 
need a profound understanding before committing to military actions. The violent 
nihilism displayed by some adversaries in the recent past defies Western nations’ 
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understanding, and Clausewitz was not confronted by a wholly similar 
phenomenon. However, this fact represents a new normal for a generation of 
fighters, and it has to be taken into account. 
In Clausewitz’s time, nations’ narratives were also divergent as concerned 
estate, dynasty, and nation and class. However, peace in 1815 settled the 
question, for a while, of which narrative was right. In today’s conflicts, as peace is 
hard to attain, the narratives diverge as well. Narrative is a part of the strategy 
which must support the operational level of war. This narrative has to be a top-
down process, coordinated with the whole of government and supported through 
the whole spectrum of actors, with one voice. Today, Western nations have to be 
realistic in their demands when going to war to secure a well-defined state of 
peace, understandable by all actors. Once a basic peace is secured, goodwill 
may build on it, incrementally. An all-or-nothing game is not possible anymore, if 
it ever was, in a limited-scale conflict. 
Finally, those “parts” have to fit in the “whole.” The “whole” as Clausewitz 
sees it is given for thoughts in On War. However, the work contains no recipe for 
victory. It is a foundation upon which thought unfolds and such thought can 
become the basis of a plan as well as action. It is a common thread which leads 
the strategy-makers to better understand the basics of war at the operational 
level and gives hints on how to solve the relationship between the “two 
strategies”—the political and the operational levels of war. As retired General 
David Petraeus remarked, “many of the concepts advanced by Clauswitz [sic] 
apply not just to the warfare of his day but to the warfare of our day. His thinking 
clearly is of enduring relevance.”431 
In the last decade, history has shown that Clausewitz’s On War retains its 
relevance and contradicts its detractors, who are recycling an old canard in a 
new context to no good effect. The Trinitarian approach—when seen as political 
purpose, chance, and the political psychology of anger and hatred—applies well 
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to violent groups of people, even without a conventional nation-state. This 
combination of factors in actual war, even holy war and counterinsurgency, 
continue to be relevant for understanding war’s interaction between respective 
and conflicted elements that defy a mathematical formula or a business school 
dogma. Terrorism, as sectarian or as a nation, uses people to convey political 
message and to achieve goals. Thus, instead of searching for who is at fault 
between Jomini and Clausewitz, it is time to go back to Art of War and On War to 
understand their complementarity in the twenty-first-century environment, thereby 
bridging the gap between Phase III and Phase IV. Classic strategic theory retains 
its value, despite the changing face of conflict. Those who must master the 
riddles and challenges of war in the past and present, to whom this study is 
addressed from a Swiss military perspective and from the vantage point of the 
U.S. Pacific slope, are ill-served by buzzwords and contemporary superficialities. 
The fundamental error of these buzzwords is the elevation of tactics to the level 
of strategy and the stripping away of the political and social from the elemental 
violence of conflict in all of its terrible variety. The element of anger and hatred 
demands its tribute today from strategists, just as Clausewitz recognized in his 
time. 
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